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Wikipedia:Featured article candidates/Mind/archive1

Mind

Mind (edit | talk | history | links | watch | logs)

As of 29 January 2025, 14:56 (UTC), this page is active and open for discussion. An FAC coordinator will be responsible for closing the nomination.
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Nominator(s): Phlsph7 (talk) 13:09, 10 January 2025 (UTC)[reply]

The mind is that which thinks, feels, perceives, imagines, remembers, and wills, encompassing both conscious and unconscious phenomena. It is relevant to various fields of inquiry, in particular, to psychology, neuroscience, cognitive science, and philosophy. Thanks to Jens Lallensack for the GA review and to Patrick Welsh for the peer review! Phlsph7 (talk) 13:09, 10 January 2025 (UTC)[reply]

Comments from Graham Beards

Thank you for engaging in our FA process.

Is this duplication needed:

"The mind is the totality of psychological phenomena and capacities, encompassing consciousness, thought, perception, feeling, mood, motivation, behavior, memory, and learning.[1]"

and

"The mind encompasses many phenomena, including perception, memory, thought, imagination, motivation, emotion, attention, learning, and consciousness.[15]

and long-term memory, which can store information indefinitely."?

The duplicated links certainly are not and there are others which need attention. As general rule, unfamiliar terms should be linked in the Lead and once more (only) in the Body.

Also, here "Some people are affected by mental disorders, for which certain mental capacities do not function as they should." Should this read "in which"?

-Graham Beards (talk) 13:43, 10 January 2025 (UTC)[reply]

Hello Graham Beards and thanks for your comments! I found a way to reformulate the passage in the section "Definition" to make it less repetitive. I also removed the duplicate links found in the two passages you mentioned. As I understand it, the rule for duplicate links changed a while back to the effect that links to the same term can occur more than once in the body if they are in different sections and contextually important.
To my ears, "for which" sounds more appropriate, but I think "in which" could also work. I'll wait for others to comment before changing the expression.
I didn't get your point about the clause on long-term memory. Phlsph7 (talk) 16:48, 10 January 2025 (UTC)[reply]
My apologies, I got distracted earlier. My point was meant to be that I think the word "indefinitely" is too strong. I have problems recalling many events that occurred more than sixty years ago. With regard to overlinking, my main concern was those terms that were linked again just a few lines further on, (which I see you have reformulated). I still think some of the repeat links are excessive such as "soul", "vertebrate", "hallucinations", "intelligence" and "nervous system", but this is not a big deal. I still think "in which" is clearer. Lastly, (for the time being), I am having problems parsing the second sentence of the Lead; "The totality of mental phenomena, it includes both conscious processes, through which an individual is aware of external and internal circumstances, and unconscious processes, which can influence an individual without intention or awareness." Why the "it"? Graham Beards (talk) 18:49, 10 January 2025 (UTC)[reply]
I weakened the formulation for long-term memory to clarify that this is not the case for everything it stores. I also removed more duplicate links and I changed the formulation to "in which". I reformulated the second sentence, I hope it is easier to parse now. Phlsph7 (talk) 09:55, 11 January 2025 (UTC)[reply]
Thanks, I'm looking forward to other reviewers' comments. Graham Beards (talk) 10:43, 11 January 2025 (UTC)[reply]

I have a few more comments on the Lead, (which I think is especially important to get right).

Could this sentence:

“Traditionally, the mind was often conceived as a separate entity that can exist on its own but is more commonly understood in the contemporary discourse as a capacity of material objects.”

Be simplified to:

“Traditionally, the mind was often thought to be an entity that can exist on its own, but is now more commonly understood as a capacity of physical objects.”

Done, but formulated a little differently. Phlsph7 (talk) 18:52, 13 January 2025 (UTC)[reply]

And is this repetition?

“meaning that minds are certain aspects or features of some material objects”

“as a capacity of material objects”

I changed it to "capacity of other entities" to avoid the redundancy. A similar formulation without the "material" was criticized during the GA review, so I'm not sure if it is an improvement. Another option would be to just say "capacity". Your suggestion of using "physical objects" instead of "material objects" would also be feasible. Phlsph7 (talk) 18:52, 13 January 2025 (UTC)[reply]

And this phrase has a fused participle:

“with theorists discussing the possibility and consequences of creating them using computers”

Perhaps recast it thus:

“and theorists are discussing the possibility and consequences of creating them using computers”.

Done in a slightly different form. Phlsph7 (talk) 18:52, 13 January 2025 (UTC)[reply]

I find the switching from singular to plural (mind – minds) inelegant, but I can live with it. Graham Beards (talk) 18:19, 13 January 2025 (UTC)[reply]

In principle, everything in the lead could be discussed using the singular only. But my impression is that for some points, the plural is better suited. Phlsph7 (talk) 18:52, 13 January 2025 (UTC)[reply]

I have no more to offer except my support. I think this article is a splendid accomplishment. (Perhaps the nominator might consider adopting Life, which has similar difficulties of definition). Graham Beards (talk) 17:52, 14 January 2025 (UTC)[reply]

Comments for ErnestKrause

Some general comments to start, with some similarities of interests as expressed by Graham Beards above. The study of various identity theories and duality theories concerning the study of the mind over the centuries does not seem to address subjects such as Type physicalism, the Mind-Brain Identity theory, the issue of Mind-Memory Identity and Duality theories, or any mention of scholars such as Gilbert Ryle throughout the article. I've mentioned the first four or five items which seemed most pertinent to my first reading of the article, and thought to ask if you have thought about each of them to any degree? ErnestKrause (talk) 15:52, 11 January 2025 (UTC)[reply]

Hello ErnestKrause and thanks for taking a look at the article! You are right that it doesn't go into much detail concerning all the different solutions to the mind–body problem in the history of the philosophy of mind. The reason is that there is too much else to cover outside this particular subfield, which is why this broad overview article leaves the details to more specific child articles per WP:SUMMARYSTYLE. I found a way to mention Gilbert Ryle, but many philosophers are not mentioned by name for the same reason as the primary topic of the article is the mind and not the history of the philosophy of mind.
In our subsection "Mind–body problem", type physicalism and mind-brain identity theory are mentioned in the sentence Type identity theory also belongs to reductive physicalism and says that mental states are the same as brain states. If you mean "substance dualism" and "property dualism" by "Duality theories", they are discussed in the passage According to substance dualism, minds or souls exist as independent entities in addition to material things. This view implies that, at least in principle, minds can exist without bodies.[67] Property dualism is another view, saying that mind and matter are not distinct individuals but different properties that apply to the same individual.[68] I can try to add some extra information if you think they should be discussed in more detail. I'm not sure which major theory you mean by "Mind-Memory Identity". Phlsph7 (talk) 18:02, 11 January 2025 (UTC)[reply]
List of Comments
  • There still seems to be some clarity that can be gained from more carefully drawing of lines between Philosophy of Mind and the current article dedicated to 'Mind' as a subject unto itself. Using the term 'Mind' as an umbrella definition for it being encountered in the Arts, on the one hand, and for it being encountered in the Sciences on the other hand is mentioned, but not developed. For example, the use of the word "Mind" in Anthropology seems significantly different from its use in Philosophy.
    One of the difficulties of writing this article was to balance the perspectives from different fields. This is explicitly addressed in the sections "Fields and methods of inquiry" and "Relation to other fields". Anthropology is discussed in the paragraph starting with "Anthropology is interested in". Phlsph7 (talk) 13:40, 15 January 2025 (UTC)[reply]
  • The ambiguity of the term by itself is also evidenced within Philosophy itself. For example, Hegel's famous book on Geist in German has had its title translated into English in different versions as "Spirit" in one translation and "Mind" in another translation. It suggests a close interchanging of term 'Mind' for 'Spirit', which some agree with and many disagree with. (The book is otherwise titled "The Phenomenology of...".)
  • As far as I'm aware, German doesn't have a term that exactly corresponds to the English term "mind", which is a challenge for translations in both directions. The second paragraph of our section "Definition" addresses terminological issues, including the term "spirit". Phlsph7 (talk) 13:40, 15 January 2025 (UTC)[reply]
I'm thinking that adding this as an example of the language gap in meaning between German and English would serve as a good example of the problem you mention of translation between languages when studying Mind. Hegel is a prominent philosophical figure and the example of the problems in translating the title of his well-known book would be highly recognizable and illustrative. ErnestKrause (talk) 15:37, 16 January 2025 (UTC)[reply]
I added a footnote to cover this point. Phlsph7 (talk) 10:05, 17 January 2025 (UTC)[reply]
  • Before going into the science aspects of the term, another example from the arts and religion might point out its use in biblical phrases such as "To love God with all one heart, mind and soul." That seems a very different context which is not covered in the current form of your article which appears to lay claim to "Mind" without qualification. Your article title does not emphasize a specialized reading such as "Mind (science)" or "Mind (arts)". Is there a reason to present the article without qualification as if it is to be Wikipedia's all purpose article on "Mind".
    I tried to make it clear that there is no one precise definition that everyone agrees on, but you are right that this is a challenging point. There is significant overlap despite disagreements about the details, as is the case for most broad-concept articles. The sections "Fields and methods of inquiry" and "Relation to other fields" deal with the different approaches, including one paragraph on various religious perspectives on the mind (starting with The concept of mind plays a central role in various religions). Do you think that the discussion on religious perspectives should be expanded? Phlsph7 (talk) 13:40, 15 January 2025 (UTC)[reply]
Under the heading of a broad understanding of Mind, it might be useful to make a short addition and to perhaps give another example or two of usage from the better known sources. I've given one example, though one or two further examples might be useful if they are from well known sources. ErnestKrause (talk) 15:23, 15 January 2025 (UTC)[reply]
I could add sentences like A well-known quote from the bible that uses the word mind is "To love God with all one's heart, mind and soul"., but without a proper context, listing quotes like this sounds like trivia. It could work if quotes were presented as examples to reinforce a different point rather than for their own sake. I'll keep the idea in mind in case I encounter appropriate examples. Phlsph7 (talk) 10:11, 16 January 2025 (UTC)[reply]
Mind as a concept in this context occurs as well in Hinduism and in Buddhist thinking; my thought was an example from each, to supplement the one I previously presented, would be useful if included together. ErnestKrause (talk) 15:37, 16 January 2025 (UTC)[reply]
Our paragraph says: "Buddhists say that there is no enduring self underlying mental activity. They analyze the mind as a stream of constantly changing experiences characterized by five aspects or "aggregates": material form, feelings, perception, volition, and consciousness.[179] Hindus, by contrast, affirm the existence of a permanent self. In an influential analogy, the human mind is compared to a horse-drawn chariot: the horses are the senses, which lure the sense mind corresponding to the reins through sensual pleasures. The senses are controlled by the charioteer embodying the intellect while the self is a passenger.[180] In traditional Christian philosophy, mind and soul are closely intertwined as the immaterial aspect of humans that may survive bodily death.[181] Islamic thought distinguishes between mind, spirit, heart, and self as interconnected aspects of the spiritual dimension of humans.[182] Daoism and Confucianism use the concept of heart-mind as the center of cognitive and emotional life, encompassing thought, understanding, will, desire, and mood.[183]" The difficulty would be to find influential quotes from well-respected translations that use the word mind and directly illustrate a points made in the article. If you know of such quotes, I would be happy to implement the idea. The quote from the bible about love does not really illustrate the point in this paragraph about immaterial aspects in Christian philosophy. Phlsph7 (talk) 10:36, 17 January 2025 (UTC)[reply]
  • Switching to the Science aspects of Mind under the Mind-Brain identity theory, then it might seem useful to compare Mind to the main modalities encountered in the study of the Brain as encountered in Science, Neuroscience, Cognitive Psychology, etc. Three or four main modalities of the Brain might be enumerated as Attention, Memory, Activation as in the Brain's executive system, and Language. The Mind-Brain identity theory then asks how Mind is related to Attention, how Mind is related to Memory, etc.
    It's possible that we are stumbling over terminological issues here. According to my understanding, the term "Mind-Brain identity theory" does not primarily refer to the study of the relation between mind and attention or mind and memory. As I know it, the term has a more limited meaning, referring to the theory that "states and processes of the mind are identical to states and processes of the brain" ([1]) Phlsph7 (talk) 13:40, 15 January 2025 (UTC)[reply]
    The points you mention are discussed in the article, but not in the context of the Mind-Brain identity theory. The different fields of inquiry are discussed in the section "Fields and methods of inquiry". The different modalities/forms of mind are discussed in the section "Forms". The relation between the mental phenomena and the brain is discussed in the section "Brain areas and processes". Phlsph7 (talk) 13:40, 15 January 2025 (UTC)[reply]
  • No mention of Alan Turing in the article, though there is mention of the Turing test as a test of human intelligence and language capacity. Does he deserve mention? Should the article say more about Mind and the scientific measurement of intelligence (intelligence quotient's and other cognitive testing, etc)?
    I found a way to mention Alan Turing in the context of the Turing Test. That's a good idea about measurement. In the text discussing research methodologies in psychology, I added a footnote using IQ tests as an example. Phlsph7 (talk) 13:40, 15 January 2025 (UTC)[reply]
  • The closest sibling article on Wikipedia appears to be the Philosophy of Mind article, and it might be useful to have this discussed at a more thorough level than just mentioning that Mind is related to the Philosophy of Mind as is currently done when you mention it next to Neuroscience near the start of the article.
    I changed it from "philosophy" to "philosophy of mind" to make this relation clearer. The terms "philosophy", "philosopher", and "philosophical" are used at various points in the article where appropriate to indicate the relation. Do you think that more such indicators should be added? Balancing here is a difficult issue, but I'm not sure that philosophy of mind is significantly more important in this context than psychology. Phlsph7 (talk) 13:40, 15 January 2025 (UTC)[reply]
  • Its evident that significant time has been put into the article and it would be useful to know if the main editor is planning to differentiate future articles on Mind into a version for the Arts, and for the Sciences, etc. There is already the Wikipedia Philosophy of Mind article, and a number of other sibling articles which are closely related. ErnestKrause (talk) 20:42, 14 January 2025 (UTC)[reply]
    I don't have concrete plans, but it sounds like an interesting project. For example, one could take the basic layout of the paragraph on religious perspectives on the mind as a blueprint and expand it into an article. Phlsph7 (talk) 13:40, 15 January 2025 (UTC)[reply]
It sounds good. Anthropological and religious perspectives if added would further balance the material already covered in the article. ErnestKrause (talk) 15:23, 15 January 2025 (UTC)[reply]
Religious and anthropological perspectives are currently covered in the paragraphs starting with "The concept of mind plays a central role in various religions." and "Anthropology is interested in". I added one more example from anthropology about the traditional beliefs in the Azande culture. I could add more perspectives if you think the current ones are not sufficient. Do you have specific ones in mind that are influential enough to be added? Phlsph7 (talk) 10:58, 17 January 2025 (UTC)[reply]
List of Comments Part 2
  • Here is a further set of sibling articles some of which do not appear in your See also list. Are all of these subjects covered in the article. Possibly some might be added.
I'm not seeing any of the navboxes in the article this morning, are you planning to bring them in later in the week? Can you link them here when you are done bringing them in? Separately, there were some more additions to the Part One comments from earlier in the week which I added when I started the Part two section, which you've largely addressed. Could you look at those comments. Your discussion of the Science of Mind looks fairly good. I'm still considering what to decide about the absence of a History section or a Background section, as a standalone section: your approach of mentioning these items contextually only and scattered throughout the article does not give a centralized discussion. Are there any options other than the current approach you've taken for either Background, or, History? ErnestKrause (talk) 15:37, 16 January 2025 (UTC)[reply]
Part of a series on
Philosophy
Philosophies
By period
By region
By religion
Branches
Philosophers
The navboxes were added in this edit. I tried it in Chrome, Edge, and Firefox: they are shown as expected for me in all browsers. We could check whether there is some kind of mixup that prevents them from being shown in your browser. Which browser are you using?
Concerning Background/History my thinking is roughly the following. Please let me know if you disagree. The topic of the article is the mind. The history of the mind and the academic study of the mind are two subtopics. The history of the mind is discussed in the subsection "Evolution" and the academic study is discussed in the section "Fields and methods of inquiry". The history of the academic study of the mind is a subtopic of the academic study of the mind and would be a subsubtopic of the mind. For this reason, I think it is not important enough to deserve a full main section per WP:PROPORTION and is probably better discussed in detail in child articles.
I hope I responded to all the recent additions to the Part One comments. Please let me know if I missed any. Phlsph7 (talk) 11:10, 17 January 2025 (UTC)[reply]
If you look at the sidebar you'll see 'Branches' which shows "Mind" if you position it in non-hide mode, which would be a nice addition based on the broad subject of your article here. This is to Support your article per GrahamBeard and Articocean. ErnestKrause (talk) 15:37, 17 January 2025 (UTC)[reply]
I'm not sure that the sidebar is a good idea: philosophy is only one besides several other disciplines studying the mind and sidebars in the lead are generally discouraged per WP:LEADSIDEBAR. Thanks a lot for the review and the support! Phlsph7 (talk) 17:44, 17 January 2025 (UTC)[reply]

Arcticocean

This is a review of the article writing and prose, from section to section. Fundamental concepts can be elusive and writing about them a challenge, so well done for producing a quality article.

The readable prose is 7,800 words which, in my view, is a little long on the long side for a technical topic in a general encyclopedia. As the sections are all distinct and of regular length, the total length is fine.

  • Lead:
    • Traditionally, minds … contemporary discourse: This sentence was confusing for quite a few passes. If I've understood your meaning correctly, then try this word order: "more commonly understood in the contemporary discourse as capacities of material objects." I am also wondering if the sentence needs to be rendered into the singular, such as "The mind was often conceived": the switch into plural for this sentence only feels jarring.
      I implemented your suggestion and changed the sentence to singular. Phlsph7 (talk) 15:16, 13 January 2025 (UTC)[reply]
    • Some characterizations … transforms information: The word choice of "private" feels imprecise and unclear: private from whom? It's explained in a body section but clearer terminology would improve the lead.
      I added a short explanation. It's a little longer now but it should still be fine. Phlsph7 (talk) 15:16, 13 January 2025 (UTC)[reply]
    • the development of the nervous system: Nervous systems as a concept are developing (evolving or emerging), is what you are saying, but the use of the singular makes it difficult to distinguish the nervous system of a given person from the concept of nervous systems. The second paragraph already jumps from issue to issue fairly rapidly, so it is easy in this lead to confuse or lose a reader through your grammar. I'd word this as "…the development of nervous systems…".
      Done. Phlsph7 (talk) 15:16, 13 January 2025 (UTC)[reply]
    • Good otherwise.
  • Definition:
    • Not prose-related, but I would be careful about claiming that the study of the mind is part of philosophy. The Pashler source is correct that the ancient philosophers studied the mind, but I think that doesn't necessarily make it part of philosophy. As our article notes, many disciplines historically formed part of the work of the philosophers; modern philosophy is something narrower.
      I changed "philosophy" to "philosophy of mind" to be more specific about the relevant branch of philosophy. Phlsph7 (talk) 15:16, 13 January 2025 (UTC)[reply]
    • Very good, otherwise.
  • Forms:
    • It is a goal-oriented activity that often: Perhaps just "It is goal-orientated and often…"? Reminding the reader that thinking is an activity does not add much. This is already a very long sentence, too.
    • a symbolic process: Is it clear enough what 'symbolic' means here?
      I followed your suggestion and I also removed the part about the symbolic process to further shorten the sentence. This part is already explained in the last sentence of the paragraph starting with As a symbolic process, thinking is deeply intertwined with language... Phlsph7 (talk) 15:16, 13 January 2025 (UTC)[reply]
  • Theories of the nature of mind:
    • This view distinguishes … refers to a piano: These sentences (describing derivative intentionality) are difficult to follow. I think you are saying that the word or picture do not refer to a particular piano or a real piano, and perhaps you should edit refer to a piano for specificity.
      I reformulated the passage in an attempt to clarify derivative intentionality. I'm not sure if I succeeded since explaining it in a few sentences is challenging. Phlsph7 (talk) 15:16, 13 January 2025 (UTC)[reply]
  • Relation to matter:
    • Property dualism is another view … the same individual: Individual is used twice in what I took to be two different senses (firstly to mean an 'individual entity' and again to mean 'a person')… Consider another word for the first instance of it, e.g. "distinct entities".
      In this case, either interpretation works. I reformulated the sentence to use the same expression from the discussion of substance dualism to make it more accessible. Phlsph7 (talk) 15:16, 13 January 2025 (UTC)[reply]
    • Monism is not really explained as there is only one, very brief, sentence on it. If I’m correct, metaphysical idealists and neutral monists are forms of monism, but the hierarchy isn’t made clear, and readers are left thinking that monism has been mentioned once and then the sentence on metaphysical idealists is a move onto something else entirely. The sentence on monism is intended to be a mini topic sentence but it doesn’t really function as one.
      I tried to better connect the sentences to make the connection clear. Phlsph7 (talk) 15:16, 13 January 2025 (UTC)[reply]
  • Non-human:
    • The separate treatment of human and non-human minds is very welcome and helps to make the adjacent sections less daunting.
    • There are a number of redirect links in this section which could be retargeted, e.g. type identity theory.
      Done. Phlsph7 (talk) 15:16, 13 January 2025 (UTC)[reply]
  • Mental health and disorder:

Throughout there is a lot of middle voice in this article, e.g. The hindbrain … the forebrain could have been "Many biological functions associated with basic survival are the responsibility of the hindbrain and midbrain". Middle voice can make the prose feel a little flat and unengaging. This article probably does not fail to be "engaging" in the sense of the FA criteria, but I think there was room to move even further up our standard for excellence. The content, structure, balance, and pace of the prose are all excellent.

The prose becomes very good within the more technical sections. This perhaps is because mind is such a fundamental topic, so early discussion of it can feel wooly. I am not able to offer any specific recommendations for improvement on this point. This is a challenging but accomplished article. Well done! arcticocean ■ 10:39, 13 January 2025 (UTC)[reply]

Hello Arcticocean, I appreciate all the helpful comments! I'll keep your point about the middle voice in mind but it can be tricky to spot. Some of the difficulties in the early discussion come from the fact that researchers often don't agree on the details. As a result, one often has to resort to vague formulations or slightly complicated explanations to remain neutral. Phlsph7 (talk) 15:16, 13 January 2025 (UTC)[reply]

Dunkleosteus77

Image review

Phlsph7, File:1206 FMRI.jpg is taken from a book, which has the terms "nclude on every digital page view the following attribution: Access for free at https://openstax.org/books/anatomy-and-physiology/pages/1-introduction", which is not followed. Also, a specific page number is not given which makes it harder to verify. You should use a different image, or upload/correct this one, as the book is available digitally.(edit-did it myself) I trust that you will do it, and a semi-comprehensive read of the page does not show me any more issues, so it's a support from my side. DoctorWhoFan91 (talk) 07:44, 16 January 2025 (UTC)[reply]

Hello DoctorWhoFan91, thanks for the image review and for taking care of the licensing details of File:1206 FMRI.jpg! Phlsph7 (talk) 09:29, 16 January 2025 (UTC)[reply]

Shapeyness

Hi Phlsph7, hopefully you're not tired of my reviews by now! Some initial comments below:

So far, I'm not getting tired of your helpful and well-informed reviews! I hope you are not getting tired of reviewing either. Phlsph7 (talk) 14:17, 17 January 2025 (UTC)[reply]
  • Following René Descartes' philosophy, minds were often conceived as immaterial substances or independent entities and contrasted with matter and body. Now they are more commonly seen as capacities of material objects. I'm not sure this is necessary in the definition section when similar ideas are repeated in the Mind–body problem section - this also leads to there being some repetition in the lead
    The point I was intending to make is a little different, but you are right that there is overlap. The idea was to clarify the ontological category (substance vs property) in layman's terms in the Definition section and leave the relation between mind and body to the Mind–body problem section. I reformulated the sentence to not mention the mind-body issue. Have a look if this is better. Phlsph7 (talk) 14:17, 17 January 2025 (UTC)[reply]
    Could that idea be moved to the mind-body section? I think this is more a substantive philosophical issue rather than a matter of definition, and definitely relevant to the mind-body problem. I don't want to push this if you are heavily against it though (unless other editors/reviewers agree). Shapeyness (talk) 19:29, 18 January 2025 (UTC)[reply]
    Done. Phlsph7 (talk) 10:01, 19 January 2025 (UTC)[reply]
    I made a similar change in the lead [2], I don't mind if you revert or adjust it if necessary. Shapeyness (talk) 17:36, 19 January 2025 (UTC)[reply]
    Looks good. Phlsph7 (talk) 09:37, 20 January 2025 (UTC)[reply]
  • Part of me also wonders whether the second paragraph in the definition section is needed given it is just contrasting mind with other concepts instead of giving a positive definition. But it looks like other reviewers haven't called this out and it doesn't take up too much space so I just wanted to bring this up as an optional thing to think over.
    It probably depends on how much the average reader already knows about these terms, which all come up later in the article. Since it is difficult to give a straightforward definition of the mind, I thought that showing how these terms overlap and differ may aid understanding. Phlsph7 (talk) 14:17, 17 January 2025 (UTC)[reply]
  • Is imagination limited to just mental images? Looking through the sources, they seem to mention images alongside things like ideas, situations and experiences. What is important seems to be that imagination creates something novel, apart from what has actually been experienced before.
    That's a good point, I reformulated the passage to widen the meaning. Phlsph7 (talk) 14:17, 17 January 2025 (UTC)[reply]
  • Some theorists distinguish between preconscious, subconscious, and unconscious states depending on their accessibility to conscious awareness. The unconscious is covered, but not preconscious or subconscious. Do you think they are important enough to include in a sentence or footnote?
    It's a little tricky because there is no general agreement on these terms. I added a footnote to cover Freud's perspective. Phlsph7 (talk) 14:17, 17 January 2025 (UTC)[reply]
  • Mental states are often divided into sensory and propositional states I haven't seen things divided like this before, but it may just be due to lack of knowledge. I have seen the distinction between intentionality and qualia but not termed in this way. Looking at the sources briefly, I can't see where the reference to sensory states has come from, do you have a more specific quote? One worry I have is that sensations often have content, and states other than sensations often have a qualitative aspect or quale.
    I think this is just an alternative terminology. From Kim 2005 p. 607: Mental events or states seem to fall under two broad kinds. One is comprised of those involving sensory qualities, or *‘qualia’ ... The second class of mental states, called ‘propositional attitudes’ or ‘intentional states’. Swinburne 2013 p. 72 calls them sensory events while Lindeman talks of qualitative mental states. I changed it to "qualitative states" and added a footnote that some mental phenomena may belong to both types.
    Yeah I thought it must just be that I hadn't come across it even though it existed, by the way I think part of the reason I got confused is that the url included in the Kim source points to a different entry ("Mind" instead of "Problems of the Philosophy of Mind") Shapeyness (talk) 17:13, 17 January 2025 (UTC)[reply]
    Ah, good that you caught this. I fixed the URL. Phlsph7 (talk) 17:50, 17 January 2025 (UTC)[reply]
  • But they do not have this kind of knowledge of the physical causes of the pain and may have to consult external evidence through visual inspection or a visit to the dentist. What do you think about adding a few extra words here to make it "But they do not have this kind of knowledge about non-mental phenomena such as the physical causes..." I think it makes the idea slightly more explicit, but appreciate it makes the sentence structure a bit more complicated.
    Added. Phlsph7 (talk) 19:06, 17 January 2025 (UTC)[reply]
  • Related (also very minor and very optional) meaning that others do not have this kind of direct access to a person's mental state "this kind of" could be cut to make this slightly leaner
    Removed. Phlsph7 (talk) 19:06, 17 January 2025 (UTC)[reply]
  • This view distinguishes between original and derivative intentionality I found the explanation of this slightly less accessible, I think it could be improved by flipping the order of the explanation. Here is an example I came up with but this is just one suggestion: "According to this view, the ability of words and pictures to refer to things derives from the fact that they can evoke a mental state. In this sense, it is the mental states that have original intentionality, and words and pictures would not refer if divorced from linguistic conventions or visual interpretations."
    I implemented a reformulated version. Another reviewer also found this passage challenging so I hope this makes it clearer. Phlsph7 (talk) 19:06, 17 January 2025 (UTC)[reply]
  • For example, part of the functional role of pain is given by its relation to bodily injury and its tendency to cause behavioral patterns like moaning and other mental states, like a desire to stop the pain. The general gist is clear, but I found the sentence hard to follow, especially following the preceding sentences
    I tried to simplify it. Have a look if the new version is better. Phlsph7 (talk) 19:06, 17 January 2025 (UTC)[reply]
    Thanks, that's a lot clearer! Shapeyness (talk) 23:18, 17 January 2025 (UTC)[reply]
  • like a diary or a calculator extend the mind's capacity to store and process information It took me a re-read or two to figure out what was happening grammatically here - maybe "such as when" instead of "like" or split into it's own sentence beginning "For example,..."? It could just be that I was reading it strangely.
    I split it into several smaller sentences. Phlsph7 (talk) 19:06, 17 January 2025 (UTC)[reply]
  • We almost got all the way to the four Es of 4E cognition :) Maybe a note on embedded cognition to cover over the last one? (Completely optional)
    Added. Phlsph7 (talk) 19:06, 17 January 2025 (UTC)[reply]
  • More comments to come.

A few more comments below. Shapeyness (talk) 00:27, 19 January 2025 (UTC)[reply]

  • Earlier philosophers typically did not see mind and body as contrasting principles What are the quotes for this? Just checking as it is quite a wide-sweeping statement
    The word "typically" makes it a little less wide-sweeping. Westphal 2016 p. 12 says There is a very common view ... that ... Descartes ... invented ... the mind–body problem. On pp. 21–22, it is explained how earlier philosophical and religious thinkers spoke of mind and body but were not interested in their precise relation. Crane & Patterson 2000, pp. 2–5 talks about how before the "Cartesian paradigm" the "Aristotelian paradigm" dominated the intellectual landscape. It goes on to discuss Aristotle's hylomorphism, according to which mind and body complement each other since the soul is the form of the body’s matter. The body is ‘ensouled’ matter, the soul imposes a form on the matter of the body. The support of these passage is not as straightforward as one would wish for but I hope it is sufficient. Phlsph7 (talk) 10:07, 19 January 2025 (UTC)[reply]
  • They understand material things as mental constructs, for example, as ideas or perceptions I think mental construct has a slightly different connotation than we want here, maybe simply "mental phenomena" or reword to "as collections of ideas or perceptions" or whatever you think is best
    Done. Phlsph7 (talk) 10:50, 19 January 2025 (UTC)[reply]
  • The sentences on reductive physicalism and behaviorism - is the page number right for the Searle source?
    You're right, the 148 should have been a 48. Phlsph7 (talk) 10:50, 19 January 2025 (UTC)[reply]
  • While non-reductive physicalists agree that everything is physical, they say that mental concepts describe physical reality on a more abstract level that cannot be achieved by physics This is incredibly minor but "achieved by physics" seems like a weird wording to me, "articulated by physics" or "derived from physics" or similar could work
    Reworded. Phlsph7 (talk) 10:50, 19 January 2025 (UTC)[reply]
  • a perspective that undercuts the distinction between mind and body How? This is left mysterious to the reader
    I tried to clarify it but I'm not sure that it is much of an improvement. There may not be a simple answer without a lengthy excursion into phenomenology. Phlsph7 (talk) 10:50, 19 January 2025 (UTC)[reply]
    I think that's a lot better! Shapeyness (talk) 14:01, 19 January 2025 (UTC)[reply]
  • The primary operation of many of the main mental phenomena is located in specific areas of the forebrain → The primary operations of many of the main mental phenomena are located in specific areas of the forebrain?
    Changed. Phlsph7 (talk) 10:50, 19 January 2025 (UTC)[reply]

A few more from my initial read-through. Shapeyness (talk) 15:07, 19 January 2025 (UTC)[reply]

I think these should be the last comments. Shapeyness (talk) 14:10, 20 January 2025 (UTC)[reply]

Support: This is an impressive article on a difficult, interdisciplinary topic! I can't speak to the psychology or neuroscience, but the philosophy of mind all looks good, and prose and media are well-done too. Shapeyness (talk) 14:34, 21 January 2025 (UTC)[reply]

Source review

Another of Phlsph7's broad topic articles, I see? Careful with the Google Books links; Google Books tends to display differently to different readers, depending on what Google knows about their reading habits, geographical location etc. so what works for you isn't guaranteed to work for others and vice versa. The advice I have heard is to never trust these links. Does the "American Psychological Association" and HarperCollins require its own item in the sources section for every word? There is inconsistent date format in the sources section, and some books have retrieval dates and others haven't. Nothing else that jumps out to me, although with so many sources stuff may be missed. Jo-Jo Eumerus (talk) 08:27, 29 January 2025 (UTC)[reply]

Hello Jo-Jo Eumerus and thanks for another source review of a challenging article! I like the idea of merging all the individual items belonging to the APA Dictionary and the AHD Dictionary into a single source and I implemented it. I removed all the excess retrieval dates from the cite book templates and used a consistent date format, I hope I got all of them. Phlsph7 (talk) 12:05, 29 January 2025 (UTC)[reply]
Quelle: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Wikipedia:Featured_article_candidates/Mind/archive1