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Why no second box on the Hamas page? I think the second box was useful. I've been trying to reply on the talk page there, but I don't know if I disagree with your goal or only disagree with your strategy, so I wanted to ask you what your goal is? Tag me if you reply here please. Industrial Metal Brain (talk) 18:45, 14 December 2024 (UTC)

@Industrial Metal Brain: Because al-Qassam is not the same thing as the Hamas political party. They are two different entities and both of them have their own separate articles with their own separate infobox Abo Yemen✉ 03:37, 15 December 2024 (UTC)

Just curious where the convention for using an 'X' next to each dead individual in the organisation comes from? Is this an accepted style on Wikipedia that I can read about?

Seems slightly odd that the deaths of these people is not linked from their own articles where appropriate, and it made me question the neutrality of the article, as it almost reads like a literal checklist of killings

(Forgive me if is this is an accepted standard style though - just very difficult to search for) 2A01:4B00:EE31:A900:B455:44AF:C641:16CA (talk) 21:02, 17 December 2024 (UTC)

It's from Template:Assassinated. No comment on the wisdom of symbol choice. Symbol choice can be tricky (e.g. a dagger for KIA is sometimes mistaken for a Christian cross, which can annoy people). You can see where the symbol for assassinated has been used here. Sean.hoyland (talk) 03:03, 18 December 2024 (UTC)

Update Leader in the Gaza Strip from Yahya Sinwar to Mohammed Sinwar. Jeffrey34555 (talk) 22:12, 13 December 2024 (UTC)

@Jeffrey34555 on that page there's as yet still no citation for Mohammed Sinwar assuming leadership in the Gaza Strip. I can find a lot of rumours and people assuming that he will take over, but no confirmation - do you have a reliable source explicitly confirming that? Smallangryplanet (talk) 16:41, 14 December 2024 (UTC)

I don't have a source; I just saw that Wikipedia says that Mohammed Sinwar is the new leader, and thought an update was needed. Jeffrey34555 (talk) 19:17, 14 December 2024 (UTC)

@Jeffrey34555 where does it say that? Someone's obviously jumped the gun. Hamas temporary committee still says no leader has been chosen. Smallangryplanet (talk) 17:37, 15 December 2024 (UTC)

I've removed references to it from Mohammed Sinwar as it's still unconfirmed, have you seen it anywhere else? Smallangryplanet (talk) 17:42, 15 December 2024 (UTC)

In Yahya Sinwar, it still says that he was succeeded by Mohammed Sinwar in the infobox. Jeffrey34555 (talk) 18:24, 15 December 2024 (UTC)

Updated, thank you. Smallangryplanet (talk) 14:16, 19 December 2024 (UTC)

 Not done: this is neither an uncontroversial improvement nor one that has consensus. Please see WP:EDITXY for more information of what an uncontroversial improvement is. M.Bitton (talk) 12:37, 19 December 2024 (UTC)

Sorry, when I made the edit request I was unaware that there were no citations supporting it. Just thought that updating was in order since a lot of the articles I saw on Wikipedia said that Mohammed Sinwar was the new leader. Jeffrey34555 (talk) 22:34, 23 December 2024 (UTC)

I am surprised: last 29 November, I explained in an unfortunately long posting (Talk:Hamas#Replacing sentence ‘While initially… signed with Fatah…’), that the statement: “While initially seeking a state in all of former Mandatory Palestine it began acquiescing to 1967 borders in the agreements it signed with Fatah in 2005, 2006 and 2007” in the lead section is unsourced; and also, that it has been inserted in the article in a very hectic period – the first week after 7 October 2023 – and without prior consent in a talk discussion; and gave three suggestions to replace that sentence. No one has yet reacted. I presume then, nobody objects to my correcting that lead sentence, in any of the ways I proposed? --Corriebertus (talk) 13:08, 6 December 2024 (UTC)

You presume incorrectly. No response does not mean agreement. We can read your previous post and respond there. Smallangryplanet (talk) 21:35, 21 December 2024 (UTC)

Thanks. Discussions are running, now. --Corriebertus (talk) 15:24, 1 January 2025 (UTC)

I think some sort of mention of the massacres during the October 7 attacks is clearly due in the lead section. The massacres during the Oct. 7 attacks (particularly the wholesale killing of over 300 people at the music festival) is probably one of the most notable acts in Hamas history, killing far more than any individual previous acts by the group. Hemiauchenia (talk) 23:49, 7 January 2025 (UTC)

The lede already says that Hamas is responsible for attacking civilians. That point is already made. You want to expand that point and add that it also commits "large scale massacres" and then link to one such event, claiming it is "one of the most notable acts in its history", which is your own subjective judgment. Now I go look at the Likud page, the Israel page (keep in mind that Hamas is the official government in Gaza), the IDF page, and I check the ledes, and I don't see any mention of them being responsible for attacking civilians, let alone for any of the many "large scale massacres" they have committed, with links to them prominently displayed. Some would say that those are some of the "most notable acts" in their history. I would disagree with them and object to the inclusion of that.

And I think we should also not do that here, as that is not a standard that is generally adopted for these topics. Raskolnikov.Rev (talk) 23:59, 7 January 2025 (UTC)

You make a good point that the IDF has also been responsible for massacring civillians e.g Khan Yunis massacre) which isn't mentioned in the lead of that article. For what its worth I'd be in favour of adding mention of stuff like that in the lead of the IDF article, but I'm fine to agree to disagree. Hemiauchenia (talk) 00:06, 8 January 2025 (UTC)

I would disagree with the massacre inclusion for the reasons mentioned in that case too, but I would support adding at least a line that they are responsible for attacking civilians, imposing starvation and indiscriminate bombing, as is the case here ("Hamas has attacked Israeli civilians, including using suicide bombings, as well as launching rockets at Israeli cities"). That is not controversial and is the consensus view in RS, and we don't have to appeal to subjective views of what is or is not most notable about them to make that assessment.

However I'll leave it to someone else to include that as I don't want to get into the inevitable longwinded discussion and RfC that will ensue.

With regard to your edit, I wouldn't object to you linking to the Nova massacre page in the "attacking civilians" reference. That seems reasonable (I would be fine with the same for the Khan Yunis or another massacre in the IDF case). Raskolnikov.Rev (talk) 00:15, 8 January 2025 (UTC)

On the paragraph:

"A number of countries, including Australia, Canada, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, and the United States have designated Hamas as a terrorist organization."

It should be mentioned that the also the European Union does list them as a terrorist organization.

Paragraph would read:

"A number of countries, including Australia, Canada, Israel, Japan, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, the United States and the European Union have designated Hamas as a terrorist organization." Nstiac (talk) 21:21, 6 January 2025 (UTC)

 Not done: this is neither an uncontroversial improvement nor one that is already supported by consensus. Please see WP:EDITXY for more information on what an uncontroversial improvement is. M.Bitton (talk) 17:20, 8 January 2025 (UTC)

There are three questions:

1. Should the section on the recognition of Israel by Hamas discuss hypothetical recognition (whether Hamas would recognise Israel) and how prominently, based on the sources in the current version?
   1. Yes, in the first sentence as in the current version
   2. Yes, less prominently later in the section.
   3. No
2. Should we mention the Israeli framing of the conflict with Hamas per Kear in the recognition section?
   1. Yes (as in the current version)
   2. No
3. How should we include Usher's 2006 opinion?
   1. In the recognition section without the year (as in the current version)
   2. In the recognition section with the year
   3. In the evolution of positions section
   4. Nowhere in the article.

This is a revised version of a previous RfC (entitled 'RFC: Recognition of Israel Section' which ran from 3 until 9 Nov 2024 and is now archived in talk Archive 29). Smallangryplanet (talk) 11:12, 9 November 2024 (UTC)

• Procedural close: The question starts of by making a statement of fact about Hamas' recognition being hypothetical, which is a POV. This is not a brief, neutrally worded question. TarnishedPath^talk 07:29, 11 November 2024 (UTC)

  Here "would" is used to describe a hypothetical situation. I'm fine with replacing the current wording with "...discuss whether Hamas *would* recognise Israel..." if that helps and if the editors who have participated in the rfc don't mind. Alaexis_¿question? 21:18, 11 November 2024 (UTC)

  @Alaexis What's the proposed change, sorry? Change Should the section on the recognition of Israel by Hamas discuss hypothetical recognition (whether Hamas would recognise Israel)... to "Should the section on the recognition of Israel by Hamas discuss whether Hamas would recognise Israel..." ? Smallangryplanet (talk) 16:00, 12 November 2024 (UTC)

  Considering that we've got a new answer to this question, I don't think it's a good idea to change the wording at this point. Would-statements describe hypothetical situations - there is nothing non-neutral here. I would've be fine with the alternative I suggested but if we restart this whole thing again we'd be really testing the patience and attention span of uninvolved editors. Alaexis_¿question? 22:26, 12 November 2024 (UTC)

  Righto, I'll leave it alone. Smallangryplanet (talk) 13:04, 13 November 2024 (UTC)

• 1B, the sources don't support that there is a debate, it's a violation of WP:FALSEBALANCE (see more). Alaexis_¿question? 21:24, 11 November 2024 (UTC)
• 1B, it is hypothetical and there isn't agreement among secondary sources. – SJ + 22:07, 12 November 2024 (UTC)
• 1B per Alaexis and Sj. Andre🚐 23:04, 12 November 2024 (UTC)
• 1A There is RS, cited on the page right now, showing there clearly is debate on the matter with scholars saying there would be such recognition. That's just a factually accurate description of the cited RS. Raskolnikov.Rev (talk) 12:47, 13 November 2024 (UTC)
• 1A As I've said ad nauseam up and down this page, there's RS showing that there is debate, there is debate on this here talk page, we're quite simply describing reality. Smallangryplanet (talk) 13:14, 13 November 2024 (UTC)
• 1C See my comment under Question Q3. The topic of the section is not well-defined, which makes the section an arbitrary incoherent summing up of (unrelated) quotes. First, make clear what the issue of the section is or must be (see my comment under Q3), otherwise there’s no point in “discuss hypothetical recognition [by Hamas]”, here. --Corriebertus (talk) 08:51, 11 January 2025 (UTC)

• B. No. I don't see that Kear is the most germane here. Andre🚐 23:08, 12 November 2024 (UTC)
• A. Yes The cited RS is from a reputed subject-matter scholar, Martin Kear, whose book is specifically focused on this topic, and whose insights cited in the section are directly relevant to the question of recognition. See no reason whatsoever to remove this, but I agree with @VR's trim suggestion here. Raskolnikov.Rev (talk) 12:53, 13 November 2024 (UTC)
• A. Yes @VR / Raskolnikov.Rev trim suggestion is fine but otherwise I think it makes sense to keep this, Kear is a subject matter expert who is regularly cited on this topic (you can find plenty more citations with a google news search) and should be included here. Smallangryplanet (talk) 13:14, 13 November 2024 (UTC)
• B. Kear is an expert but this is a section about Hamas's recognition of Israel and Israel's treatment of resistance is irrelevant. Alaexis_¿question? 22:13, 1 January 2025 (UTC)
• B. Kear's opinions as mentioned now in the section are too vague and even seem contradictory (caused by a hurriedly excerpting of two K sentences using the word "recognis..." while in both cases we don't get to know how K defines, understands, that crucial word), so I'd propose to delete that whole K paragraph as not notable and not relevant here. For a start of course (and in that point I agree with Alaexis), delete that challenged "...Israeli framing ... per Kear...". The fact that K is an “expert” (as some say) doesn’t imply that a (too) shoddy and/or loose quoting and/or paraphrasing out of one of K’s books automatically must be considered relevant enough for any Wikipedia article. --Corriebertus (talk) 21:39, 10 January 2025 (UTC)

• 3 A. Usher's statement is notable and there's no clear reason to have a date (which is given in the citation). If we started putting dates on every sentence in this article, it would become an unreadable mess.VR _{(Please ping on reply)} 05:35, 10 November 2024 (UTC)
• 3 C. It was 18 years ago, lots of things have happened since then, including Hamas rejecting the two-state solution. It's like saying that Israel is ready to give East Jerusalem to Palestinians now because it was offered in 2008. Alaexis_¿question? 21:53, 10 November 2024 (UTC)
• 3C, even evaluations of what signing the prisoner's document meant changed in the years after 2006. – SJ + 22:07, 12 November 2024 (UTC)
• 3C per Alaexis and Sj. Andre🚐 23:05, 12 November 2024 (UTC)
• 3 A As I noted in the discussion here, Graham Usher is a subject-matter expert whose cited point on the page is not conditional, and in fact later events only further bolstered its accuracy. So there is no reason to remove this RS, and no reason to artificially make it appear as being conditional by adding a year specification. The Kear and Baconi back it up as well. Raskolnikov.Rev (talk) 12:58, 13 November 2024 (UTC)
• 3 A for the same reasons as @VR. There is no indication that Usher's opinion changed, either. Smallangryplanet (talk) 13:14, 13 November 2024 (UTC)
• 3 D The concept of “recognition [of Israel]” is not defined in the section (‘Rcg of Israel [by Hamas]’), which makes its starting sentence meaningless (and unsourced). This omission makes the rest of the section merely an incoherent summing up of quotes of people using the word “recognition” in whatever sense (not explicitated by Wikipedia), which is not my idea of “debating” an issue. While Usher (2006) does not even use the term ‘recognition’, talks only of ‘consider..’ and ‘accept..’ (which are not the subject of the section), Usher's remarks should be deleted here as out-of-order. (By the way: a correct opening sentence of the section would be: ‘Many analysts and politicians have used the phrase of Hamas’s (hypothetical) 'recognition of Israel', but there’s no reason to assume that they all mean the same thing by it.’) --Corriebertus (talk) 08:32, 11 January 2025 (UTC)

• Comment, can the filer of this RFC advise what has changed since Talk:Hamas/Archive 23#RFC: Should Hamas be described as accepting the 1967 Israeli borders in the lead? that this is being relitigated? TarnishedPath^talk 07:21, 11 November 2024 (UTC)

  Pinging @KlayCax, @Vice regent, @RadioactiveBoulevardier, @Bharell, @Iskandar323, @Senorangel, @Cjhard, @Penguino35, @Alaexis, @Mhhossein, @Aquillion, @חוקרת, @Selfstudier as editors who were involved in the discussion at Talk:Hamas/Archive 23#RFC: Should Hamas be described as accepting the 1967 Israeli borders in the lead?. TarnishedPath^talk 07:37, 11 November 2024 (UTC)

• At least if I read right, this RFC is talking solely about the Recognition of Israel section, whereas the previous RFC was just about the acceptance of borders in the lead of the article. While of course the two should line up, I don't think any of the options here contradict the lead - the current version of the lead says While initially seeking a state in all of former Mandatory Palestine it began acquiescing to 1967 borders in the agreements it signed with Fatah in 2005, 2006 and 2007. In 2017, Hamas released a new charter that supported a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders without recognizing Israel. I would think that recognizing borders and accepting Israel are the same thing, but that second sentence is well-cited, so apparently not and Hamas itself draws a distinction between these two things, which means the outcome of the previous RFC doesn't tell us anything about how to handle the recognition section in the body. Perhaps we could have a sentence in this section that mirrors the one in the lead, though, with a bit more detail on the distinction between accepting borders and recognizing Israel (though some of the quotes seem to tacitly touch on it.) --Aquillion (talk) 19:40, 11 November 2024 (UTC)

• Comment on clarifying that sentence in the lede emerging from the previous RFC: from a different ongoing discussion, in that sentence in the current lead "acquiescing" seems too strong, as per the artful sidestepping VR quotes below. Also the phrase "in agreements signed with Fatah in 2005, 2006, and 2007" seems a direct quote from Seurat but it is confusing – only the 2006 prisoner's document mentions borders, and it was more than an agreement signed with Fatah. What were the other agreements? They are not mentioned in the body, nor is any trend during 2005-07 mentioned in that way in the body. – SJ + 22:07, 12 November 2024 (UTC)

"According to Martin Kear, Israel treats "any form of resistance from Palestinians as acts of terrorism", and therefore responds to any resistance with extraordinary force. In contrast, writes Kear, Hamas operationalizes "...its resistance to Israeli occupation through its invocation of jihad ... Accordingly, Hamas refuses to recognise Israel as a legitimate actor..."[148]" The above statement, in its entirety appears to be irrelevant to discussion of whether Hamas recognizes Israel. "recognise Israel as a legitimate actor" is not related to diplomatic recognition of whether Israel has a claim to pre-1967 territories. Not all instances of the word "recognise" mean the same thing, and its clear from the context here that its not talking about diplomatic recognition. But the following does appear to be relevant:

"However, Kear goes on to note that without expressly stating it Hamas agreed to respect the Oslo Accords, and by extension Israel's existence: "The signing of the 2007 Mecca Agreement also meant that Hamas had met two of the three stipulations set down by Israel and the Quartet: recognising Israel and respecting all previous Israeli-Palestinian agreements."" However, it is slightly misleading. Earlier in the paragraph, Kear does indeed say Hamas had "artfully sidestepped the ideological black hole tied to any explicit recognition of Israel's right to exist. Hamas's leadership demonstrated a willingness and ability to push through this key ideological concession to remain an integral player in the Palestinians politics."

So it seems Kear is saying, correctly, that Hamas implicitly recognized Israel by agreeing to a Palestinian state on only WB and GS, but refrained from giving any explicit recognition of Israel. This should be made clear.VR _{(Please ping on reply)} 05:48, 10 November 2024 (UTC)

I would rephrase it as this. "Martin Kear points out that in the 2007 Mecca agreement, Hamas agreed to respect PLO's previous agreements with Israel, including the Oslo Accords that Hamas had previously criticized. After the Mecca Agreement, Hamas leader Khaled Meshaal said any future agreement with Israel must establish a Palestinian state along the 1967 borders, with East Jerusalem as its capital, and an acknowledgement of the Palestinian right of return. Kear interprets this statement as Hamas further implicitly recognizing Israel, while withholding explicit recognition." VR _{(Please ping on reply)} 06:23, 10 November 2024 (UTC)

That Hamas "implicitly recognised" Israel is a viewpoint shared by some (though by no means all) observers and it's already mentioned in the first paragraph of the section, so there is no need to repeat that.

The reader may wonder having read that why Hamas is not ready to explicitly recognise Israel, and Kear provides the explanation: the religious framing of the conflict. This is not found elsewhere is the article and clearly notable. Alaexis_¿question? 21:44, 10 November 2024 (UTC)

No, Kear says Hamas' not giving explicit recognition of Israel has more to do with it withholding recognition as a bargaining chip. This is, incidentally, Baconi's position as well. The part about "recognise Israel as a legitimate actor" isn't about diplomatic recognition. The word "recognise" is a polyseme.VR _{(Please ping on reply)} 06:49, 11 November 2024 (UTC)

I'm not opposed to mentioning the "recognition as a bargaining chip" perspective in the section again. That shouldn't be controversial, we don't need an RfC for that.

As to the semantics of the word recognition, the section doesn't only deal with the diplomatic recognition narrowly defined. Alaexis_¿question? 22:28, 12 November 2024 (UTC)

Kear’s research, according to his profile blurbs on various platforms, is focused on a specific analytical framework and may not be applicable outside said framework. Anyway, I am not sure there is not a WP:DUE problem. RadioactiveBoulevardier (talk) 05:46, 13 November 2024 (UTC)

The sentence Whether Hamas would recognize Israel is debated should not be the first sentence of this section. We should start with facts rather with WP:CRYSTALBALL speculations. It's like starting the article about the Golan Heights "Whether Israel would return the Golan Heights to Syria is debated" [1].

The "debate" framing is not supported by the sources. The USIP source actually states that "Hamas might never 'recognize' Israel in the conventional sense" - this is not evidence of debate, but rather the opposite [2]. The Haaretz article refers to a single statement by Abu Marzouk suggesting possible recognition, which was directly contradicted by Abu Marzouk himself just one week prior when he explicitly rejected recognition of Israel [3] The overwhelming preponderance of statements from Hamas leadership consistently reject recognition.

This creates a WP:FALSEBALANCE issue - we're presenting a single outlier statement as equal to the organization's consistent official position. Khaled Hroub's analysis of conditions under which Hamas might theoretically recognize Israel can be included later in the section but it should not be presented as the leading framing. Alaexis_¿question? 21:59, 10 November 2024 (UTC)

I think the sentence could definitely be tweaked to provide more context, but it's not WP:CRYSTALBALL - that policy is that we're not supposed to speculate about the future ourselves. Predictions by experts about what Hamas might do or accept in the future, on the other hand, are highly relevant to this article and ought to be covered. We could find more sources for it, but I do think that it's sort of the entire purpose of the section; the article is already clear that Hamas doesn't recognize Israel currently (that's implied by the first sentence of the section) and sources indicating that it doesn't do so don't contradict people talking about the future. Nor is a source saying Hamas might never 'recognize' Israel in the conventional sense, emphasis mine, really in contradiction with it - that describes the possibility as something debatable, which is what our article says! --Aquillion (talk) 19:47, 11 November 2024 (UTC)

Well, the question is why we should center the hypothetical future recognition rather than the current and historical reality. I'm not opposed to mentioning it somewhere in this section btw. Also, there are major issues with sourcing for this statement. Alaexis_¿question? 21:27, 11 November 2024 (UTC)

Usher wrote it in 2006 before the takeover of Gaza by Hamas, several small-scale conflicts between Hamas and Israel, the 2017 document and the current war. There are many sources published in the last 5-10 years that deal with the policy of Hamas. We don't need it in this section, we should rather move the sentence to the Hamas#Evolution of positions section. Alaexis_¿question? 21:59, 10 November 2024 (UTC)

Why can't it be in both places? It's clearly relevant to Hamas' recognition of Israel.VR _{(Please ping on reply)} 06:46, 11 November 2024 (UTC)

For the same reason why we can't say in present tense that Israel offers East Jerusalem to the Palestinians because they did it in 2008. Lots of things have happened since then, including Hamas rejecting the two-state solution. Also, dozens of books and scholarly articles have been published more recently and we should use those when talking about the current situation. Alaexis_¿question? 21:34, 11 November 2024 (UTC)

The first link is from 2019 and seems like a typo, and the second link quotes Meshal after he was no longer the leader of Hamas. We wouldn't say "the United States considers Israel to be an apartheid state" based on the writings of an ex-president. You're most welcome to quote recent sources, but you don't seem to have done that.VR _{(Please ping on reply)} 05:49, 12 November 2024 (UTC)

Thanks, I've fixed the typo. Haniye, the head of Hamas, said in 2020 that one of the principles of Hamas is 'Palestine from the sea to the river' around 11:40. Maybe in your opinion this is consistent with "accepting Israel as a political reality" but many scholars disagree with that. ^[1][2]

I'm happy to include those references, but lets clarify them first.

• Nasir Faeq on page 33 quotes (Hroub 2000) and "guidelines [that] are summarized in a statement by the Political Bureau of Hamas dated April 1994" as saying Hamas wouldn't recognize Israel. There appear to be no references later than 2000 that Faeq quotes in which Hamas rejects recognition, correct?
• Alsoos quotes Hamas's 1988 Charter as rejecting Israel's recognition (page 6 and 7) before noting that "However, after its electoral victory in 2006, Hamas did not implement the Charter as policy, but instead agreed to work within the Palestinian political system based on secular Basic Law." It also quotes Haniyeh saying "Hamas will not recognize the Zionist entity" in 2003. Again, there appear to be no references later than 2003 of Hamas rejecting recognition, correct?

So there don't appear to be any contradiction here. It seems Hamas was adamant about not recognizing Israel prior to 2005-ish, when it starting signing agreements that accepted the 1967 borders.VR _{(Please ping on reply)} 03:55, 13 November 2024 (UTC)

I'm going to propose different wording options, please give me feedback and I'll amend my proposal accordingly.

Hamas's leaders have emphasized they don't recognize Israel. But, Hamas has also repeatedly accepted the 1967 borders (such as the 2006 Prisoners' document and the 2007 Mecca agreement), thus acknowledging the existence of another entity on the other side. Whether Hamas would recognize Israel in a future peace agreement is debated.

Mousa Abu Marzook, then the vice-president of Hamas' Political Bureau, explained his party's position in 2011: while Hamas did not recognize Israel as a state, it considered the existence of Israel as "amr waqi" (or fait accompli, meaning something that has happened and cannot be changed). He called this "de facto recognition" of Israel. Likewise, Graham Usher writes that while Hamas does not consider Israel to be legitimate, it has accepted Israel as political reality.

In 2017, Hamas once again accepted the 1967 borders in its new charter, that "drop[ped] the call for the destruction of Israel from its manifesto." But it did not abrogate the old charter, and other scholars believe that Hamas retains the long-term objective of establishing one state in former Mandatory Palestine.

Tareq Baconi explains that Hamas' implicit recognition of Israel is in contrast to most Israeli political parties who have long opposed the idea of a Palestinian state.

VR _{(Please ping on reply)} 07:03, 12 November 2024 (UTC)

Looks pretty good to me. TarnishedPath^talk 07:29, 12 November 2024 (UTC)

This is a bit better but still has NPOV issues. I'd suggest waiting until we get external feedback via the RfC, otherwise it can lead to confusion. Alaexis_¿question? 22:45, 12 November 2024 (UTC)

I also support this version. It would have been better to have gotten to this right away instead of having a convoluted RfC with 9 options. Raskolnikov.Rev (talk) 13:15, 13 November 2024 (UTC)

+1 on supporting this version (as mentioned in the survey) Smallangryplanet (talk) 13:24, 13 November 2024 (UTC)

Hamas leaders have repeatedly emphasized they do not recognize Israel.^[1] But Hamas has also repeatedly accepted the 1967 borders in signed agreements (in 2005, 2006, and 2007^[2]) and in its 2017 charter, thus acknowledging the existence of another entity on the other side.^[3][4] Whether Hamas would recognize Israel in a future peace agreement is debated.^[5][6][7] Several scholars have compared Hamas's lack of recognition of Israel to Likud's lack of recognition of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza.^{[8][9][10][11][12]}

The 1988 Hamas charter strongly rejected any recognition of Israel.^[13] In 1994, the Political Bureau of Hamas repeated this rejection.^[14] However, after Hamas won the 2006 elections, it did not implement then 1988 Charter as policy, and instead agreed to work with the existing Palestinian political system.^[13] In the 2007 Mecca agreement, Hamas agreed to respect previous agreements between Fatah and Israel, including the Oslo Accords in which the PLO recognized Israel.^[2] Both in the 2007 agreement and in the 2006 Palestinian Prisoners' Document, Hamas agreed to a Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders. Scholars see this as "implicit" recognition of Israel because by accepting a Palestinian state limited to the 1967 borders, Hamas acknowledged the existence of another entity on the other side.^[3]

Mousa Abu Marzook, then the vice-president of Hamas' Political Bureau, explained his party's position in 2011: while Hamas did not recognize Israel as a state, it considered the existence of Israel as "amr waqi" (or fait accompli, meaning something that has happened and cannot be changed).^[15] He called this "de facto recognition" of Israel.^[15] Likewise, Graham Usher writes that while Hamas does not consider Israel to be legitimate, it has accepted Israel as political reality.^[16]

In 2017, Hamas once again accepted the 1967 borders in its new charter, that "drop[ped] the call for the destruction of Israel from its manifesto."^[17] But it did not abrogate the old charter, and other scholars believe that Hamas retains the long-term objective of establishing one state in former Mandatory Palestine.^[18][19]

Tareq Baconi argues that Hamas has learned from the fact that, in the 1993 Oslo Accords, the PLO made a "historic concession" in recognizing Israel on 78% of the land of historic Palestine (along the 1967 borders), but was unable to convince Israel to recognize Palestine on the remaining 22% of the land. Having already recognized Israel, the PLO was unable to use recognition to extract any further concessions from Israel. Thus, Baconi opines, the lesson for Hamas was that you can't negotiate from a position of weakness.^[20]

• Here is a new version with some of the sources Alaexis mentioned incorporated. Thoughts? (Raskolnikov.Rev—TarnishedPath—Alaexis—Smallangryplanet).VR _{(Please ping on reply)} 21:45, 13 November 2024 (UTC)

Thanks, I believe that this version is even better but it can be improved, mainly to comply with WP:DUE. I'll respond in greater detail later.

I couldn't find anything about the recognition on page 206 of Brenner's Gaza Under Hamas: From Islamic Democracy to Islamist Governance. Could you re-check and provide a quote that supports this passage? Alaexis_¿question? 05:45, 14 November 2024 (UTC)

@Alaexis are you looking at a different edition? Here it is on the google books copy: Of equal key importance was Hamas's revised position on the establishment of a Palestinian state. The new document still referred to Palestine as the territory 'from the river to the sea. However, it also added that it accepted the pre-1967 lines as the borders of a Palestinian state, with Jerusalem as its capital and the right of return for refugees. While not explicitly saying what would be on the other side of these borders, this nevertheless acknowledged the existence of another entity there. In addition, Hamas expressed that it would be ready to back 'any peace agreement', would it be approved in a popular referendum. These new formulations amounted to nothing less than a de facto recognition of Israel. During its deliberations, the movement had reached an internal agreement on accepting a two-state solution. (Brenner, p.206) Smallangryplanet (talk) 10:13, 14 November 2024 (UTC)

That's weird, I'm looking at the 2017 edition and I can't find this text anywhere in the book. The google books link unfortunately doesn't work for me, it says "no preview available." Google Books says that the book was published in 2016, I dunno, maybe there were different editions indeed.

I'm sure that this text is legitimate, hopefully we'll find the reason for all this confusion.

Btw, which document does Brenner talk about in the excerpt that you quoted? Alaexis_¿question? 20:29, 14 November 2024 (UTC)

@Smallangryplanet Alaexis_¿question? 20:36, 15 November 2024 (UTC)

It is talking about the 2017 Hamas charter. The version I'm looking at was published in 2022, so mentioning the 2017 charter makes sense.VR _{(Please ping on reply)} 21:28, 15 November 2024 (UTC)

Thanks, now it's clear! I was confused since the google books link above is to the 2016 edition. Alaexis_¿question? 20:40, 16 November 2024 (UTC)

This is good, but flagging two things: The "Faeq, Nasir; Jahnata, Diego (2020-09-12)" source appears to be published by a pay to play publishing mill so fails WP:REPUTABLE. The authors are also nowhere to be found as working scholars (at least I haven't been able to), and the piece itself is as expected riddled with basic grammatical errors.

Also I think we need an explanation for the de facto acceptance of Israel as a reality and the lack of a formal, official recognition. Baconi is cited but I don't think it covers exactly the three specific points he makes in this regard on the cited page, 230:

"While Hamas may indeed continue to harbor ideological aspirations for the liberation of the entirety of Palestine after such a peaceful settlement, the likelihood that the movement would have popular backing for such a step is likely to be nonexistent if a just settlement is offered. Khaled Meshal has even offered written guarantees to international mediators underscoring this, noting that Hamas would abide by the outcome of any referendum to a peace deal delivered to the Palestinian people, including deals that entail mutual recognition, while stressing that Hamas would not accept those outcomes until the deal is implemented.97

It is more likely the case that Hamas is simply maintaining this ideological intransigence as a negotiating tactic and a matter of principle, tying into the movement’s legitimacy and its effectiveness as an interlocutor. 98 The movement believes that conceding the remaining cards that Hamas still clings to would ensure that Palestinian rights continued to be forfeited, as had happened following the PLO’s recognition of Israel. As one leader explained, “Why should we be forced to explicitly recognize Israel if we’ve already indicated we have a de facto acceptance of its presence?”99

Hamas’s implicit acceptance of Israel has gone far beyond what many Israeli political parties, including the dominant ruling Likud party, have offered Palestinians within their charters. With their refusal to recognize the right of Palestinian self-determination, their insistence that the Palestinian people never existed, and the intermittent resurfacing of the “Jordan option,” several Israeli political parties have long opposed the notion of a Palestinian state.100 In 2013, Prime Minister Netanyahu publicly reneged on his highly touted 2009 Bar Ilan speech in which he spoke of the possibility of a demilitarized Palestinian state.101"

So we have Baconi saying Hamas leaders offered written guarantees to accept any peace deal, including formal recognition, if certified by referendum (it's not only Meshal, but others have reiterated this too at later points) 2) That they are holding on to not extending formal recognition as both a negotiating tactic against the Israelis who have not offered the same in return and they see conceding this as the PLO did as forfeiting their rights, and then the de facto point is made again but that's superfluous here, already noted in the section. 3) It points to many Israeli political parties including the ruling dominant Likud not extending the same acceptance to Palestinians within their charters.

Could this be incorporated in the Baconi paragraph in a trimmed form summarizing these points? Raskolnikov.Rev (talk) 15:18, 14 November 2024 (UTC)

@Raskolnikov.Rev thanks for this.

3) I agree that, according to Baconi, Hamas is more accepting of Israel than Likud is of Palestine. However, some sources imply say Hamas is as (not more) accepting of Israel as Likud is of Palestine. Does anyone besides Baconi say Hamas is more accepting than Likud? VR _{(Please ping on reply)} 21:10, 15 November 2024 (UTC)

Here are some sources that say Hamas is more accepting of Israel than Likud and other Israeli major parties of Palestine:

Page 16 and 168-69 of Noam Chomsky Ilan Pappé's "Gaza in Crisis: Reflections on Israel's War against the Palestinians":

"There is no need here to run through the ugly details, but the U.S.- Israel made sure that Hamas would not have a chance to govern. And of course, the two leaders of the rejectionist camp flatly rejected Hamas’s call for a long-term cease-fire to allow for negotiations in terms of the international consensus on a two-state settlement, which the United States and Israel reject, as they have done in virtual isolation for over thirty years, with rare and temporary departures. Meanwhile, Israel stepped up its programs of annexation, dismemberment, and imprisonment of shrinking Palestinian cantons in the West Bank, always with decisive U.S. backing despite occasional minor complaints, accompanied by the wink of an eye and munificent funding."

"Hamas cannot recognize Israel any more than Kadima can recognize Palestine or than the Democratic Party in the United States can recognize England. One could ask whether a government led by Hamas should recognize Israel, or whether a government led by Kadima or the Democratic Party should recognize Palestine. So far they have all refused to do so, though Hamas has at least called for a two-state settlement in accord with the long-standing international consensus, while Kadima and the Democratic Party refuse to go that far, keeping to the rejectionist stance that the United States and Israel have maintained for over thirty years in international isolation. As for words, when Prime Minister Olmert declares to a joint session of the U.S. Congress that he believes “in our people’s eternal and historic right to this entire land,” to rousing applause, he is denying any meaningful rights to Palestinians.8 Often that rejection is explicit government policy, as in 1989, in response to formal Palestinian acceptance of a two-state settlement, when the coalition Peres-Shamir government declared that there can be no “additional Palestinian state” between Jordan and Israel, Jordan already being a Palestinian state by Israeli decision—backed explicitly by the United States. But far more important than words are actions. Israel’s settlement and development programs in the occupied territories—all illegal, as Israel was informed in 1967 by its highest legal authorities and affirmed recently by the World Court—are designed to undermine the possibility of a viable Palestinian state. By providing decisive support for these policies throughout, the United States is taking the same stand. In comparison to this rejection of Palestinian rights, words are insignificant. On Hamas, I think it should abandon those provisions of its charter, and should move from acceptance of a two-state settlement to mutual recognition, though we must bear in mind that its positions are more forthcoming than those of the United States and Israel."

And from their "On Palestine", page 147-48: "In January 2006, Palestinians committed a major crime: they voted the wrong way in a carefully monitored free election, handing control of Parliament to Hamas. The media constantly intone that Hamas is dedicated to the destruction of Israel. In reality, Hamas leaders have repeatedly made it clear that Hamas would accept a two-state settlement in accord with the international consensus that has been blocked by the United States and Israel for forty years. In contrast, Israel is dedicated to the destruction of Palestine, apart from some occasional meaningless words, and is implementing that commitment. True, Israel accepted the road map for reaching a two-state settlement initiated by President George W. Bush and adopted by the Quartet that is to supervise it: the United States, the European Union, the United Nations, and Russia. But as he accepted the road map, Prime Minister Sharon at once added fourteen reservations that effectively nullify it. The facts were known to activists, but revealed to the general public for the first time in Jimmy Carter’s book Palestine: Peace Not Apartheid. They remain under wraps in media reporting and commentary.

The (unrevised) 1999 platform of Israel’s governing party, Benjamin Netanyahu’s Likud, “flatly rejects the establishment of a Palestinian Arab state west of the Jordan river.” And for those who like to obsess about meaningless charters, the core component of Likud, Menachem Begin’s Herut, has yet to abandon its founding doctrine that the territory on both sides of the Jordan is part of the Land of Israel."

There are also these sources:

https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20141011-forget-its-charter-hamas-has-given-de-facto-recognition-to-the-state-of-israel/

https://nena-news.it/hamas-likud-double-standard/

https://www.latimes.com/entertainment-arts/books/story/2023-11-27/avi-shlaim-israel-hamas-war-q-a

And here are sources on Likud and other major Israeli political parties and politicians saying they refuse to accept/recognize Palestine under any conditions:

https://www.haaretz.com/opinion/2014-06-03/ty-article/.premium/double-standard-netanyahus-coalition-wouldnt-pass-bibis-test-for-hamas/0000017f-e631-da9b-a1ff-ee7f9a7d0000

https://www.timesofisrael.com/senior-likud-mk-says-netanyahu-vowed-hell-never-recognize-a-palestinian-state/

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/7/18/israels-knesset-votes-to-reject-palestinian-statehood

https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/2/21/israeli-parliament-backs-netanyahus-rejection-of-a-palestinian-state

https://www.972mag.com/there-is-no-status-quo-only-greater-israel/

https://www.uq.edu.au/news/article/2014/11/israel%E2%80%99s-policy-statehood-merits-same-scrutiny-hamas-gets

https://www.timesofisrael.com/likud-opposed-to-a-palestinian-state-says-hardliner-mk/

https://www.thenation.com/article/world/its-time-to-confront-israels-version-of-from-the-river-to-the-sea/

It is well-established that Israeli major governing parties like Likud have refused to recognize Palestinian statehood under any conditions, the constant references to "Judea and Samaria", and this has only increased in recent times with the Knesset passing a resolution opposing Palestinian statehood:

https://www.haaretz.com/israel-news/2024-07-18/ty-article/knesset-passes-resolution-against-establishment-of-palestinian-state/00000190-c2c6-d13a-ad92-caffa4b90000

So I think it is worthwhile to keep this and if Baconi itself is not sufficient include some of these other RS to back up his position.

Also what do you think about including the point about Hamas giving guarantees that they will accept any peace deal passed by referendum, including explicitly with recognition, and also adding a bit more specific detail on the reasoning behind the bargaining with not extending formal recognition? Raskolnikov.Rev (talk) 11:47, 24 November 2024 (UTC)

Yeah, this is a not a reputable journal.

However, there are other sources that confirm that the "liberation" of the whole Palestine remains the goal of Hamas. See for example Hamas in Power (2023), p. 175

“

It views the liberation of territories occupied by Israel in 1967 as a stage in the liberation of Palestine as a one unified entity

”

. Alaexis_¿question? 19:33, 18 November 2024 (UTC)

Sources like the one you cited say that it remains a final stage long-term goal for reasons outlined by for example Baconi. In any case the "Faeq, Nasir; Jahnata, Diego (2020-09-12)" source should be removed for failing WP:REPUTABLE. Can you get to that as well @Vice regent? Raskolnikov.Rev (talk) 11:52, 24 November 2024 (UTC)

The article says (in passing) that a "number" of countries designates Hamas as a terrorist organization and it lists 7 countries, giving the impression it's a "localized" matter, downplaying the importance of being listed as a terrorist organization anywhere and failing to mention that the European Union formed of 27 countries also lists them as a terrorist organization.

In fairness it is well worth at least mentioning that the European Union has also listed Hamas as a terrorist organization.

I've already suggested this edit. Nstiac (talk) 16:45, 11 January 2025 (UTC)

 Not done: please provide reliable sources that support the change you want to be made. Abo Yemen✉ 16:48, 11 January 2025 (UTC)

nvm it was done by @Hemiauchenia but on what source? Abo Yemen✉ 16:54, 11 January 2025 (UTC)

The sources are in Hamas#Terrorist designation Hemiauchenia (talk) 01:01, 12 January 2025 (UTC)

Good edit. Andre🚐 01:40, 12 January 2025 (UTC)

ah alright Abo Yemen✉ 05:01, 12 January 2025 (UTC)

https://www.mako.co.il/news-israel/2025_q1/Article-4e2194511007491026.htm?sCh=31750a2610f26110&pId=1714755257 — Preceding unsigned comment added by 2A0D:6FC0:ED6:5800:985A:52A1:8FA9:76BF (talk) 23:24, 16 January 2025 (UTC)

@Vice regent: (=VR): I’ve heard you say once or several times, that you’d specifically care to see some mentioning of the 2005–07 agreements between Hamas and Fatah in the lead section of Hamas.

Firstly, I don’t very well understand, why you consider those accords of so great importance as wanting to have them in the lead section. Ofcourse, I will not and cannot deny that those accords exist; and ofcourse they can be mentioned somewhere in the article, as is currently done in section Hamas#Evolution of positions. But then, a lead section can never repeat everything from the body of the article, and those three accords don’t make a so very remarkable impression on me (they are three attemps to reconcile Fatah with Hamas by (deliberately!?) vaguely(!) phrasing what supposedly unites them: the wish for ‘a Palestinian state’ and ‘confronting the occupation’) as being indispensable for the lead section.

Secondly, the way these three accords are currently presented in the lead section simply is false, incorrect, as I’ve argued on this talk page on 29 November 2024; so the choice now is to either simply remove that false mentioning or replace it with some correct statement. I tend now to just fully remove it, because: (a) the three accords themselves don’t seem very striking, influential, etc. (to a degree as being indispensable for the lead); (b) the assertion made by Baconi, Roy and Seurat about those accords, reported in our lead section now in three (short) quotes (which is not the suggested paraphrasing that stands now in our lead section), is so very vague (Hamas purportedly wanted to ‘accept the 1967 borders’, but for what? for a permanent state or for a temporary intermediate state?) that I see no good reason to copy such meaningless vagueness into our article nor into Wikipedia anywhere.

Thirdly, the scholarly or rhetorical position of Roy/Baconi/Seurat might become encyclopedically relevant for Wikipedia in case we knew whether these authors refer to a permanent or to a temporary Palestinian state within 1967 borders; if we had clarity on that point, we might first of all place that scholarly position/interpretation in the Wikipedia articles about those signed Documents – though it would probably still not qualify for the lead section of Hamas. Therefore my question to you: can you expand those three short quotes, in such a way that it becomes clear, whether these three authors refer to a permanent or to a temporary state-in-1967-borders? --Corriebertus (talk) 18:55, 12 December 2024 (UTC)

I agree that they are given way too much weight in the article. These are not foundational documents like the original charter or the 2017 document. It's not clear why they should take precedence over many other statements made by Hamas officials over the last 20 years. Alaexis_¿question? 21:25, 13 December 2024 (UTC)

Thanks. As soon as I’ll find my good energy, I’ll work on correcting that part. By the way: currently, the problem is not mainly that they get ‘too much weight’, but that they are simply represented incorrectly (see my arguing).
And yes, after the reparations I propose above, we might perhaps add something in the lead about ‘statements…over the last 20 years’. --Corriebertus (talk) 07:02, 14 December 2024 (UTC)

Remark towards @Alaexis: We are working towards a compromise lead text involving the 2005–07 documents; see my posting entry below in this talk section towards Smallangryplanet (Smp) at this same moment. If we’d implement that compromise text in the lead, would you then still recommend an extra line about “other” Hamas statements ‘over the last 20 years’, or would you consider this compromise text (labeled B2--) balanced and complete enough? --Corriebertus (talk) 15:24, 1 January 2025 (UTC)

@Alaexis: My latest revised proposal can be found in my latest reaction, today, in talk section Talk:Hamas#Replacing sentence ‘While initially… signed with Fatah…’, in the thread of discussion with VR(Vice regent). --Corriebertus (talk) 08:52, 17 January 2025 (UTC)

I'm not sure I understand your point here. Are you saying that a single line noting the three agreements – in the context of Hamas acquiescing to the 1967 borders – which are abundantly demonstrated by RS and in the body and have been repeatedly backed by consensus in talk considering various attempts to remove it... should be removed because it's not lead-worthy?

Additionally re Roy/Baconi/Seurat, there's an existing RfC for that, where we have discussed this at truly stunning length. Smallangryplanet (talk) 16:36, 14 December 2024 (UTC)

@Smallangryplanet: I think you miss the point of this talk section. This talk section is about whether (and why) the 2005–07 agreements are important enough for the lead section. That the current representation of them in the lead section is incorrect (because misrepresenting what Roy/Baconi/Seurat say about them in those quotes) has been argued by me in talk section: “Talk:Hamas#Replacing sentence ‘While initially… signed with Fatah…’” (29Nov2024); you are welcome to disagree with that assessment and argument in that talk section (thus not here), by challenging any of my given arguments, overthere.
You say, that that single lead line (= sentence) about these agreements is “abundantly demonstrated by RS and in the body and have [=has] been repeatedly backed by consensus”. I’d like to hear from you, where in the body; I see that the 3 or 2 or 1 agreement(s) are mentioned in the body but outside the lead section I find no mention of them saying in these agreements Hamas has declared to no longer seek a Plst state in all of mandatory Palestine (which is what the lead currently asserts: see my argument in Talk:Hamas#Replacing sentence ‘While initially… signed with Fatah…’). I’d also like to hear from you, when the assertion that Hamas during 2005–07 gave up its claim on ‘all mndt Palestine’ has been “backed by consensus” in the Wikipedia community (or even merely been discussed): I’m not aware of such discussion having taken place.
You specifically refer to a recent (November 2024) talk discussion about section ‘Recognition of Israel’. I see no mention in it of 2005–07 agreements saying Hamas gives up its claim on ‘all Palestine’. Whatever the issues were in that discussion, it resulted in only one mention of the 2007 agreement in that Recognition section: some mr. Kear, arguing, around some unclear ‘stipulations’ and without any corroboration or quote, that in the 2007 Agreement Hamas “recognis[ed] Israel” (etc.). I’m staggered that such utterly vague excerpt of a reasoning is deemed encyclopedic by Wikipedia; you’re not suggesting to elevate that utterly vague excerpt of a reasoning, of one (ephemeral) author, into the lead of article Hamas, are you? If so: why, where and in what context? --Corriebertus (talk) 13:53, 19 December 2024 (UTC)

@Corriebertus The section in the lead in question that I think you're taking issue with does not say what you are saying it says. Let's have a look - as of 14:03 UTC 2024-12-19 it reads as follows:

Hamas has promoted Palestinian nationalism in an Islamic context. While initially seeking a state in all of former Mandatory Palestine it began acquiescing to 1967 borders in the agreements it signed with Fatah in 2005, 2006 and 2007. In 2017, Hamas released a new charter that supported a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders without recognizing Israel. Hamas's repeated offers of a truce (for a period of 10–100 years) based on the 1967 borders are seen by many as being consistent with a two-state solution, while others state that Hamas retains the long-term objective of establishing one state in former Mandatory Palestine.

This is exactly what you are asking for. It describes what happened - Hamas' changing goals over the years in various agreements. It correctly reports what various experts have said, both for and against (WP:DUE) the notion that Hamas has changed or not its long term objective. If you disagree with those experts, that's not grounds for removing what they have to say from the lead. We are telling the reader what they are saying. I believe this is relevant for the lead, because the overall goals of the organisation are important for understanding the remaining content. Speaking of which, all of the content there has been substantially sourced in the body of the article and discussed at length up and down this talk page.

I'm not sure why you made this edit, since (1) it's a direct quote and (2) it explains the stipulations, and we link to the other places on wikipedia where the reader can learn about them. If those pages need building out, that's fair and something I can add to my list of things to do at some point. If it's a matter of disagreeing with their conclusions, then I don't know what to tell you. Smallangryplanet (talk) 14:12, 19 December 2024 (UTC)

This is a disappointing style of discussing. Is it deliberate bluff? Fantasy? Subconscious or half-conscious wishful thinking? On 14 December 2024 already, @Smallangryplanet: contended that the specific lead sentence of Hamas which I’ve taken issue with (29 November, on this talk page), is “abundantly demonstrated (…) in the body (…)”. So I ask him, on 19 December: “Where in the body”? On 19 Dec, Smallangryplanet (Smp) simply ignores that question and only repeats that that lead sentence is “substantially sourced in the body(…)”. But the claim that something is stated in the body of a Wikipedia article, or even in a Wiki discussion, needs to be made explicit on demand; if it can’t be made explicit, it is not a valid argument in a discussion, but either a mistake or a bluff.

The same holds for Smp’s contention 14 Dec that that lead sentence is “backed by consensus in talk(…)”: I ask him 19 Dec “when the assertion” as made in that lead sentence “has been backed by consensus”, again Smp does nothing else than repeat that it “has been(…)discussed at length(…)”. If such a claim can’t be made explicit on demand, it is not a valid argument, in a Wiki discussion.

I’m not disagreeing with the notion that Hamas, possibly, has changed its “goals” and/or “long term objective” over the years. I’m only saying, that the way in which Hamas purportedly has changed them, as currently alleged in that one specific lead sentence of Wikipedia which I’ve taken issue with (29 November, on this talk page), is incorrect/unsourced, and is not the way how those three given references (Roy etc.)—nor any other sources in the article—describe Hamas having changed their ideas. I’ve carefully explained my criticism on that lead sentence, in that posting of 29 Nov.; especially to give Vice regent, who made the sentence (for the greatest part), the chance to defend that sentence; which he appears not to be interested in. There are possible ways to correctly describe the (possible) changes in Hamas’s ideas; I’ve given several examples for that in that posting of 29 November. --Corriebertus (talk) 11:39, 21 December 2024 (UTC)

There is a whole section devoted to this.

Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, founder of Hamas, who died in 2004 (killed by Israel), has at unreported date offered Israel a ten-year hudna (truce, armistice) in return for establishment of a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza. Yassin later added, the hudna could be renewed, even for longer periods...

---

On 28 June 2006, Hamas signed the second version of (originally) 'the Palestinians' Prisoners Document' which supports the quest for a Palestinian state "on all territories occupied in 1967"...

---

In an August 2006 interview with The New York Times, Ismail Haniyeh, senior political leader of Hamas and then Prime Minister of the Palestinian National Authority, said: "We have no problem with a sovereign Palestinian state over all our lands within the 1967 borders, living in calm."

---

In February 2007, Hamas signed the Fatah–Hamas Mecca Agreement, stressing "the importance of national unity as basis for (...) confronting the occupation" and "activate and reform the PLO", but without further details about how to confront or deal with Israel. At the time of signing that 2007 agreement, Mousa Abu Marzook, Deputy Chairman of the Hamas Political Bureau, underlined his view of the Hamas position: "I can recognize the presence of Israel as a fait accompli (amr wâqi') or, as the French say, a de facto recognition, but this does not mean that I recognize Israel as a state". More Hamas leaders, through the years, have made similar statements.

---

and so on. Citations amply provided on the page itself. I am not sure what else you are looking for. (Note that these quotes are just a smattering of examples.) Smallangryplanet (talk) 11:56, 21 December 2024 (UTC)

@Smallangryplanet: After two times not proving his argument in the body of the article, Smp this third time(21 Dec) mentions two statements in the article, purportedly reporting what is said in the lead section about the 2005–07 Agreements: the June 2006 PP Document “supports the quest for a Palestinian state "on all territories occupied in 1967"” and the Feb 2007 Mecca Agreement being about “confronting the occupation” etc.. But still these quotes from the body of the article do not say, what the Wikipedia lead section alleges, that in the 2005–07 agreements Hamas dropped their claim to a state in ‘all of Palestine’. So, we must conclude now, that Smp’s assumption and allegation, that the lead sentence ‘While initially…’ etc. is based on statements in the body of the article, has not been proven or demonstrated by him or anyone.

If we base the lead section on the body of the article (as we normally should), we can only say in the lead—after a sentence about the Hamas goal as stated in the 1988 Charter(see my 29 Nov posting)—something like:
“Since 2006, Hamas in a (2006) Document signed with Fatah and in other statements has also showed willingness to accept a Palestinian state in "the 1967 borders".”
This proposal is a slight variation, you might say compromise (labeled B2--), on option (B--) which I gave in that posting of 29 November, now explicitly mentioning the 2006 Hamas–Fatah agreement because colleagues appreciate those agreements to be explicitly mentioned in the lead section. --Corriebertus (talk) 15:24, 1 January 2025 (UTC)

Even if it's true that the quotes from the body do not say that Hamas dropped their claim to a state in ‘all of Palestine', it's also true that, crucially, neither does the lead. The lead says that they began acquiescing to the 1967 borders. We are arguing about a distinction or a problem that does not exist. Smallangryplanet (talk) 08:56, 8 January 2025 (UTC)

@Smallangryplanet: Sorry. The lead sentence ‘While initially…’ clearly constructs a contrast between a Hamas position until 2004 and a purportedly changed position as of 2005. The earlier position is about an envisioned permanent status: an Islamic Palestinian state in all of former mandatory Palestine. The described changed position, after 2005, is described as ‘accepting’ (acquiescing to) other, narrower, borders. But while no explicit comment is made by that second position as to whether this new position should be about a permanent or a temporary state, the reader will naturally assume that it is still, just as in the beginning of the (long) sentence, about a permanent status (thus dropping that goal of achieving that larger state ‘in all of Palestine’). But Wikipedia shows no grounds to assert that: neither in the body of the text, nor in the three quotes in the lead of the article. My latest revised proposal can be found in my latest reaction, today, in talk section Talk:Hamas#Replacing sentence ‘While initially… signed with Fatah…’, in the thread of discussion with VR(Vice regent). --Corriebertus (talk) 08:52, 17 January 2025 (UTC)

The most pertinent allegation here is that the information is false. I'll reply to that claim in "Replacing sentence ‘While initially… signed with Fatah…’".VR _{(Please ping on reply)} 03:58, 26 December 2024 (UTC)