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Conservatism in Taiwan

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Conservatism in Taiwan
(Republic of China)
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Related topics
See also: History of the Kuomintang and Chinese nationalism § In Taiwan

Conservatism in Taiwan is a broad political philosophy which espouses the One-China policy as a vital component for the Republic of China (ROC)'s international security and economic development, as opposed to Taiwanization and Taiwanese sovereignty. Fundamental conservative ideas are grounded in Confucian values and strands of Chinese philosophy associated with Sun Yat-sen's teachings, a large centralized government which intervenes closely in the lives of individuals on both social and economic levels, and the construction of unified Sinocentric national identity. Conservative ideology in Taiwan constitutes the character and policies of the Kuomintang (KMT) party and that of the pan-blue camp.

Origins and philosophy

Socioreligious tradition of Confucianism

There are four basic elements of Confucianism which apply to conservatist governance. The Paternalistic State entails top-down decision making under the notion that the “Father is the head of the house, and likewise, the state the head of society.” Leaders possess, jen, a supreme virtue representing human qualities at their best which determines their right to rule. The idea of social order and harmony translates into the assumption of the benevolent state - ren/humaneness, with which civil society works together - shu/reciprocity, rather than oppose, monitor, and scrutinize.[1]

Sun Yat-sen's Political Perspectives

Many of the Kuomintang's policies were inspired by its founder Sun Yat-sen’s vision, and his Three Principles of the People: nationalism (民族主義), democracy (民權主義) and people’s livelihood (民生主義). These three principles combine to make Taiwan a free, powerful, and prosperous nation, although they are selectively interpreted in a specific context which deviates from Sun Yat-sen's original intent. For example, during Chiang Kai-shek’s rule and much of Chiang Ching-kuo’s, the authoritarian state overshadowed democracy by censoring the people’s voice. However, most of his political ideas which were later adapted by his successors in governing Taiwan included equalization of land ownership, learning Chinese traditional morality through Confucian values, and the regulation of state capital by national corporations.[2]

Chronology of Kuomintang governments

Main article: History of the Kuomintang § Chronology of Kuomintang governments

Current status

Party instability and regaining trust

Domestically, conservatism within the KMT treads a thin line. The rise of a pan-Taiwanese independence movement with mainly of younger members, that does not acknowledge that existence of the 1992 consensus and hence claims that Taiwan is already independent, has challenged the status quo and called for greater ROC sovereignty in multilateral politics and economics.[3] As a result, the return of the KMT into power will likely be predicated on a more careful maintenance of pragmatic diplomacy which foreseeably involves drawing Taiwan closer to the PROC through a variety of methods, such as sharing social spaces in international institutions, making diplomatic visits, signing economic deals. In each case, the KMT must promise to keep a safe distance in order to reflect the beliefs of a vigilant populace. To further exacerbating this tension, the KMT has also suffered from undemocratic perceptions, after its evasion of a clause by clause review of the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement, which prompted the Sunflower Student Movement to damage the party's credibility. In the future, the KMT must improve transparency to rebuild trust between it and the Taiwanese populace.[4]

Deteriorating relationship with the PRC

In recent years, the KMT has been gradually falling out of China's favor. Following the KMT election loss of 2016, the KMT began to shift its pro-China policy towards the median to better represent the view of the electorate. In short, they began campaigning under the ideal of multiculturalism, which included both “Chinese” and “Taiwanese” citizens. However, this change in the party line was criticized by China.[5]

Other conservatives

Conservative Taiwanese nationalists

Lee Teng-hui, president of the Republic of China from 1988 to 2000, was a member of the conservative Kuomintang when he took office and led Taiwan's democratizing reforms. He sought to 'Taiwanization' the Kuomintang, now known as the Chinese Nationalist Party. After Lee endorsed the candidates of the newly formed Pan-Green Taiwan Solidarity Union, a party established by a number of his KMT allies, Lee was expelled from the KMT on 21 September 2001.[6] Lee is known as a devout Christian. In 2014, there was a controversy when he expressed his negationist views on Nanjing Massacre and Comfort women, sensitive issues in Korea and China, in the Japanese magazine SAPIO published by Shogakukan.[7]

The Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) is politically conservative pan-Green party, which opposes transgender rights.[8][9] Unlike TSU, other progressive pan-Green parties support LGBT rights.[10]

The Taiwanese Localism Front, a radical anti-communist organization, is also referred to as the far-right; They are strongly opposed to China (PRC) and defend militarist policies.[11]

Pro-Beijing camp

See also: United front in Taiwan and Far-right politics § Taiwan (Republic of China)

Chinese nationalists in Taiwan insist that ROC is the real "China," sticking to ROC-legalism, anti-communism and opposing one country, two systems. On the other hand, some Chinese nationalists, called "radical pro-unification factions", are pro-PRC position and support one country, two systems, and even pose a physical threat to Taiwanese nationalists and pro-democracy camp in Hong Kong. Because the PRC is a one-party dictatorship, pro-Beijing conservatism in Taiwan, a liberal democracy, is sometimes described as "far-right".[12]

Known examples of pro-Beijing right-wing parties include the Chinese Unification Promotion Party,[12] Patriot Alliance Association,[12] For Public Good Party,[13][14] and New Party.[15][16] However, within the pro-Beijing camp, there are also leftist, socialist / communist parties, including the Labor Party, Taiwan Democratic Communist Party and Taiwan People's Communist Party.

Kuomintang continues to be opposed to communism, as anti-communism is written under Article 2 of Kuomintang's party charter. However, some politicians, including Hung Hsiu-chu, are classified as "pro-Beijing".[17][18]

Political parties

Main article: Pan-Blue Coalition

The Conservative parties in Taiwan or the so-called "pan-blue camp" includes the Kuomintang (KMT), the People First Party (PFP) and the New Party (NP). However, conservative parties in Taiwan do not always belong to pan-blue camp.

The Kuomintang is the main conservative party and currently is the largest opposition party in the Legislative Yuan, with 52 seats.[19]

People's First Party is a liberal conservative party, founded by former KMT General Secretary and Taiwan Provincial Governor James Soong after the 2000 presidential elections.[19]

Current parties

Historical parties

Media

Prominent figures

See also

References

  1. ^ Huang, Chun-chieh; Wu, Kung-ming. "Taiwan and the Confucius Aspiration: Towards the Twenty-first Century" (PDF). NTU Databases. 3: 72–86 – via ntu.edu.tw.
  2. ^ (Taiwan), Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of China (1965-04-01). "Dr. Sun Yat-sen's Political Philosophy - Taiwan Today". Taiwan Today. Retrieved 2018-01-13.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  3. ^ "'Taiwan Independence' Doesn't Mean What You Think". Foreign Policy. Retrieved 2018-01-13.
  4. ^ "The 'Sunflower Movement' and the 2016 Taiwan presidential elections". Archived from the original on 2018-01-18. Retrieved 2018-01-13.
  5. ^ "Party Watch Initiative". Party Watch Initiative. 16 October 2017. Retrieved 2018-01-13.
  6. ^ "Taiwan's KMT expels former president". BBC. 21 September 2001. Archived from the original on 12 June 2018. Retrieved 1 June 2016.
  7. ^ 李登輝氏 ホラ話を広め軋轢を生む中国はリーダーになれない. news-postseven.com (in Japanese). 27 January 2014. Archived from the original on 17 August 2017. Retrieved 12 May 2016.
  8. ^ "Taiwan Solidarity Union Positions Itself Against Trans Rights". New Bloom Magazine. December 19, 2023. Retrieved March 18, 2025. The Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU), which currently holds no seats in the Legislative Yuan but has historically positioned itself as a politically conservative pan-Green party, has taken a stance against trans rights with recent actions.
  9. ^ "What Trump's Election Means for Anti-Gender Mobilisation in Taiwan". Taiwan Insight. December 9, 2024. Retrieved March 18, 2025. In the lead-up to the US presidential election, Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) Chairwoman Chou Ni-an (周倪安) published an op-ed proclaiming that "'Conservative Values' Will Be Significant Factor Deciding US Election." Being self-described as a conservative Taiwanese independence party, TSU was the first minor political party in Taiwan to (unsuccessfully) attempt campaigning on a platform against transgender rights.
  10. ^ "Where Do Trans Rights Stand in Taiwan After Same-Sex Marriage Legalization?". The Diplomat. 1 November 2023. Retrieved March 18, 2025.
  11. ^ "《逆統戰》把「反中」做成好生意". Commercial Times (in Chinese (Hong Kong)). Archived from the original on 2023-01-28. Retrieved 2020-11-03.
  12. ^ a b c 蕭嘉弘 (2018-09-21). "台灣急統派不是民主極右勢力！" [Taiwan's 'radical pro-unification factions' is not a 'democratic far-right'.]. 民報 Taiwan People News. Archived from the original on 2023-06-18. 標榜大中國民族主義，屬於極右的愛國同心會和統促黨則完全不同，... [The far-right Patriot Alliance Association and Chinese Unification Promotion Party, which advocates Chinese ultra-nationalism, is completely different, ...]
  13. ^ "中華民族致公黨 for public good party——兩岸融合，再創新機". Facebook (in Chinese).
  14. ^ "中華民族致公黨 for public good party——立場堅定，旗幟鮮明，推動國家統一，民族復興". Facebook (in Chinese).
  15. ^ Bernice Lee (September 13, 2013). The Security Implications of the New Taiwan. Taylor & Francis. p. 1954. ISBN 978-1-136-06212-4. Peng, the DPP's pro-independence challenger, secured 21%, while pro-Beijing New Party candidate Ling Tang-Kang polled only 15%.
  16. ^ Fen-ling Chen, ed. (2000). Working Women and State Policies in Taiwan: A Study in Political Economy. Springer. ISBN 9780230508873. The New Party, which split from the KMT in 1994, is a conservative party and on the far Right.
  17. ^ "Taiwan's ruling party replaces pro-Beijing candidate Hung Hsiu-chu". CNBC. 19 October 2015.
  18. ^ "The Strange Case of the KMT's Hung Hsiu-chu". The Diplomat. 23 June 2015. With the more moderate members of the KMT seemingly standing by, Hung has forged ahead with a radical pro-Beijing policy that has much in common with the pro-unification New Party.
  19. ^ a b "2024 Elections: Jockeying for legislative speakership starts up". www.taipeitimes.com. 15 January 2024. Retrieved 2025-01-04.
  20. ^ Reilly, Michael (October 17, 2021). "Taiwan: Will it retain independence or be taken over?". The Island Online. Archived from the original on November 12, 2021. Retrieved May 30, 2024.
  21. ^ 黃清龍, ed. (2020). 蔣經國日記揭密：全球獨家透視強人內心世界與台灣關鍵命運. p. 158. 保守的,當時黨內出現「開明派」與「保守派」之爭,前者力主反共政策應當調整,黨禁、報禁必須開放,否則就得不到民心,後者則以國家安全為訴求,強調「安全第一、秩序第一,領導權威不容懷疑」等,蔣經國明顯是站在保守派這一邊,而保守派的代表人就是王昇 ...
  22. ^ "Taiwanese polling in a climate of fear". Taiwan News. June 21, 2023.
  23. ^ Mary Alice Haddad, ed. (2023). Environmental Politics in East Asia. Cambridge University Press. p. 2011.
  24. ^ "Taiwan's ruling party endorses conservative pro-China candidate Hung Hsiu-chu for presidential run". Australian Broadcasting Corporation. 19 Jul 2015.
  25. ^ Gunter Schubert, ed. (2024). Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Taiwan. Taylor & Francis. Han Kuo-yu, seen by many as the 'Taiwanese Trump' due to his populist appeal to conservative social values
Quelle: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Conservatism_in_Taiwan
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