Operation Argument[1]
Part of the Western Front of World War II
Date 20–25 February 1944 Location Nazi Germany, Nazi-occupied Netherlands Result see Aftermath
Belligerents
United States  United Kingdom	Germany
Commanders and leaders
Jimmy Doolittle Carl Spaatz Arthur Harris	Hermann Göring Adolf Galland
Strength
US Eighth Air Force US Fifteenth Air Force RAF Bomber Command RAF Fighter Command[2]	Luftwaffe
Casualties and losses
RAF: 131 bombers[3] USAAF: 226 heavy bombers[4] 28 fighters[4] Over 2,000 aircrew killed or captured[4]	262 fighters[4] 250 aircrew killed or injured,[4] including nearly 100 pilots KIA[5]
c. 880 civilian deaths during the Bombing of Nijmegen,[6] 57 civilian deaths in Arnhem,[7] 40 civilian deaths in Enschede,[7] 1 civilian death in Deventer.[7]

Operation Argument,^[1] after the war dubbed Big Week,^[1] was a sequence of raids by the United States Army Air Forces and RAF Bomber Command from 20 to 25 February 1944, as part of the Combined Bomber Offensive against Nazi Germany. The objective of Operation Argument was to destroy aircraft factories in central and southern Germany in order to defeat the Luftwaffe before the Normandy landings during Operation Overlord were to take place later in 1944.^[a]

The joint daylight bombing campaign was also supported by RAF Bomber Command operating against the same targets at night.^[8] Arthur "Bomber" Harris resisted contributing RAF Bomber Command so as not to dilute the British "area bombing" offensive against Berlin. It took an order from Air Chief Marshal Sir Charles Portal, Chief of the Air Staff, to force Harris to comply.^[2]

RAF Fighter Command also provided escort for USAAF bomber formations, just at the time that the Eighth Air Force had started introducing the improved long range P-51 Mustang fighter which gave the USAAF bomber forces more cover deeper into Germany, to take over the role. The offensive overlapped the German Operation Steinbock, the Baby Blitz, which lasted from January to May 1944.^{[citation needed]}

In the summer of 1943, the Luftwaffe had about 2,200 fighters available on average, and several bombing raids by the USAAF and RAF were repeatedly interrupted by 500 German fighters or more.^[9] Allied intelligence also indicated that the German aircraft industry was capable of producing about 2,000–3,000 planes per month, so the need to diminish the enemy's manufacturing potential soon was evident.^[9] Therefore, massive Allied air raids on German industrial areas had been conducted throughout 1943, but to little effect; the results were far lower than the expectations.^[9] German industrial complexes of multiple major factories (such as in Leipzig, Wiener Neustadt, and Regensburg) proved difficult to thoroughly destroy, easy to repair, and the logistics of transporting materials between factories were almost impossible to effectively disrupt.^[10]

Prior to Big Week, throughout 1943, the US 8th Air Force had been growing in size and experience and started pressing attacks deeper into Germany. It was originally believed that the defensive firepower of the ten or more .50 caliber machine guns on the Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress and Consolidated B-24 Liberator bombers would allow them to defend themselves as long as they remained arranged into tight formations, allowing for overlapping fire. Throughout 1942 the concept seemed solid enough, as the loss rate had been under 2%.^[11] However, the Luftwaffe reacted by sending more planes armed with heavier weaponry to oppose the raids, with increasing success, as evidenced by the example of the two Schweinfurt-Regensburg missions.

On 17 August 1943, 230 USAAF bombers launched a mission against the ball bearing factories in Schweinfurt and another 146 against the aircraft factories in Regensburg. Of this force, 60 aircraft were lost before returning to base and another 87 had to be scrapped due to irreparable damage. The Germans claimed 27 fighters lost, serious enough, but small in comparison to the losses on the part of the US forces. The Second Raid on Schweinfurt on 14 October 1943, remembered as "Black Thursday" while October 1943 as a whole as a "black month"^[12]), proved even more bloody; of the 291 aircraft on the mission, 60 were lost, with a further 17 damaged beyond repair. The self-defense concept appeared flawed enough, and losses among the bombers deemed unsustainable: daylight missions into Germany were canceled in order to rebuild the forces and find new tactics to fend off German fighters.^[13]

The raids were extensively studied by both sides. The Germans concluded that their tactic of deploying twin-engine heavy fighter designs, with heavy armament to make them usable as bomber destroyers and serving primarily with the Zerstörergeschwader combat wings, was working well. Over the winter of 1943–44 they continued this program, adding to their heavy fighter ranks and developing heavier armaments for all of their aircraft. Both sides observed that US fighters did a good job at protecting bombers and destroying German fighters; the Germans responded by pulling almost all of their fighter forces back into Germany itself, to attack US bombers where US fighters could not support the bombers due to lack of range. The Americans concluded they needed long range escort fighters and examined all aircraft they had that could fit the role. As early as July 1943 the North American P-51 Mustang appeared the most promising, thanks to its range, high altitude performance, and reliability. Over the winter they re-equipped many of their fighter squadrons as more Mustangs arrived and modifications allowed existing fighters to have a longer range.^[14] The Eighth Air Force was increasing in size as more complete bombardment and fighter groups arrived from the US. The Luftwaffe was increasing in size but the quality of training of their pilots was less than that of the new American units.

By early 1944, both forces had laid their plans and were waiting to put them into action. The US, confident in a fighter advantage, planned missions that would demand a German response. They decided to make massive raids on the German fighter factories. If the Germans chose not to respond, they would be at risk of losing the air war without firing a shot; if they did respond, they would meet the new long-range fighters in the process. The Germans needed no provocation: they were ready to meet a raid with their new forces. However, the increased weight of armaments in their fighters reduced performance, making them easy targets for the new and unexpected Mustangs.^[15]

The goal of Operation Argument was to destroy aircraft factories in central and southern Germany in order to destroy the German aircraft industry as a whole.^[1][16] This would then allow Allied air superiority over the Luftwaffe to be achieved, which was considered absolutely critical in advance of the upcoming invasion of Northern France.^[1][9][17]

Brinkhuis (1984) contended that the operation's target was attacking Germany's aircraft industry,^[9] 'going back to a plan that had already been made in October 1943. This plan, operation Argument, was the biggest Allied air action so far. The ambitious enterprise had the total destruction of the German aircraft industry as its goal.'^[18] 'The manufacture of these [fighters, such as Messerschmitt 109, 110, and the Focke-Wulf 190], saw such a steep rise that the USAAF and RAF had good reason to fear that the defense of Hitler's Festung Europa with all these aircraft would lead to a horrible massacre amongst Allied flight crews. Therefore, the primary goal of the Allied Airforce became the destruction of the factories producing these aircraft.'^[9] Planners estimated that the Allies would lose between 7% and 18% of their aircraft every day.^[18] In order to achieve the objective, U.S. commander Frederick L. Anderson was prepared to sacrifice three quarters of all planes and crew (meaning 736 bombers, from a total of 981 bombers).^[19] The Allies proceeded to gather intelligence on all parts of German industry involved in producing parts, engines, wings and airframes, as well as assembling factories.^[9] However, operational success was foreseen to heavily depend on several consecutive days of good weather, meaning ideal cloud covers between about 600 and 4,000 meters above England, but no clouds above the target areas in Germany.^[18] As such a situation was extremely rare, leadership decided to launch the campaign anyway as soon as the forecast showed the smallest signs of acceptable flying weather.^[18]

Similarly, Van Esch (2012) analyzed the Allied strategy from the perspective of the Casablanca directive of 21 January 1943, according to which the Allied bombers' "Primary object will be the progressive destruction and dislocation of the German military, industrial, and economic system, and the undermining of the morale of the German people to a point where their capacity for armed resistance is fatally weakened" with "The German aircraft industry" being the second of the six primary of objectives, after "German submarine construction yards."^[20][9] The idea was that disrupting the German aircraft production capacity was the best way to reduce German aerial combat potential.^[21]

On the other hand, according to McFarland & Newton (1991), Big Week was not primarily a bombing campaign, but a campaign designed to kill Luftwaffe fighters.^[17] Two tactical factors made this difficult. First, Luftwaffe fighters avoided Allied fighters and would simply ignore the fighter sweeps. Thus, the Allies could not entice the Luftwaffe fighters to engage. Second, during escort missions, Allied fighters remained in close escort formation with bombers. This tactic limited bomber casualties but it also reduced Allied pursuit and destruction of Luftwaffe fighters. Recognizing these problems, Major General Jimmy Doolittle, commander of Eighth Air Force from the end of 1943, ordered bombing missions of key aircraft factories that the Luftwaffe could not ignore. In addition, the mission of the Allied fighters was altered in emphasis – rather than protection of the bombers, it was attack the Luftwaffe fighters. In effect, the primary purpose of the bombing missions was to bring up the Luftwaffe and the real role of the Allied bombers was to be used and sacrificed as bait.^[17] Van Esch (2012) stated: 'However, also to the surprise of Allied analysts, German aircraft industries were still able to increase production of fighter aircraft, even after three years of strategic bombing. In this war of attrition, the number of trained and experienced pilots proved the most decisive factor, though, rather than the availability of fighter aircraft.'^[21]

As of 22 February 1944^[22] under the United States Strategic Air Forces in Europe commanded by Lieutenant General Carl Spaatz,^[9] the U.S. Eighth Air Force – Major General James H. Doolittle,^[9] and Major General Frederick Lewis Anderson^[23]

• 2nd Bombardment Division^[22]
  • 20th Combat Bombardment Wing
    • 93d Bombardment Group^[22]
    • 446th Bombardment Group^[22]
    • 448th Bombardment Group^[22]
  • 14th Combat Bombardment Wing (second wave)^[22]
    • 44th Bombardment Group^[22]
    • 392nd Bombardment Group^[22]
  • 2nd Combat Bombardment Wing (third wave)^[22]
    • 389th Bombardment Group^[22]
    • 445th Bombardment Group^[22]
    • 453rd Bombardment Group^[22]
• 3rd Bombardment Division – Major General Curtis LeMay^[24]
  • 333 Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress bombers^[24]

There were 981^{[dubious – discuss]} bomber aircraft available for Operation Argument in total.^[23] The B-24 Liberator usually had a crew of ten men, sometimes with an extra navigator.^[22] Each bombardment group usually consisted of three squadrons with a total of 36 bombers.^[22]

The Americans flew continuously escorted missions against airframe manufacturing and assembly plants and other targets in numerous German cities including: Leipzig, Brunswick, Gotha, Regensburg, Schweinfurt, Augsburg, Stuttgart and Steyr. In six days, the Eighth Air Force bombers based in England flew more than 3,000 sorties and the Fifteenth Air Force based in Italy more than 500. Together they dropped roughly 10,000 tons of bombs.^[25][26]

Big Week opened with the RAF night attack on Leipzig. Apart from the destruction caused, the German anti-aircraft defenses would still be suffering from fatigue the following day when the USAAF hit.

RAF Bomber Command directly contributed to the attacks on the aircraft industry in Schweinfurt. Some 734 bombers were dispatched on the night of 24/25 February, and 695 reported they struck the target.^[2] However, analysis of the photographs taken during the raid showed that only 298 of the aircraft dropped their bombs within three miles of the aiming point.^[31] Of these, only 22 hit inside the target area; that is, they came down within the boundaries of the built-up districts of the city.^[32] Little damage was done due to creepback: marker aircraft dropped markers short, and bombers dropped their payload at the first markers seen rather than at the center of the markers.^[32]

On 25/26 February 1944, Bomber Command sent almost 600 aircraft to the aircraft assembly plant at Augsburg.^[32] This time, the markers were dropped accurately, the attack was accurate and destroyed about 60 percent of the industrial city.^[32]

During Big Week, the Eighth Air Force lost 97 B-17s, 40 B-24s and another 20 scrapped due to damage. The operational strength of the Eighth Air Force bomber units had dropped from 75 percent at the start of the week to 54 percent, and its fighter units strength had dropped from 72 percent of establishment strength to 65 percent. The Fifteenth Air Force lost 14.6 percent (90 bombers) of establishment strength, and RAF Bomber Command lost 131 bombers (5.7 percent) during Big Week.^[34] Although these numbers are high in absolute terms, the numbers of bombers involved in the missions were much higher than previously, and the losses represented a much smaller percentage of the attacking force. The earlier Schweinfurt missions had cost the force nearly 30 percent of their aircraft per mission.^{[citation needed]}

German losses were 262 fighters,^[4] 250 aircrew killed or injured,^[4] including nearly 100 pilots killed in action.^[5] US aircrews claimed more than 500 German fighters destroyed, though the numbers were exaggerated by 40% compared with actual numbers.^[35] The Luftwaffe losses were high amongst their twin-engined Zerstörer units, and the Bf 110 and Me 410 groups were severely depleted.^[36] More worrying for the Jagdwaffe (fighter force) than the loss of 355 aircraft was the loss of nearly 100 pilots (14 percent) who had been killed.^[5] In contrast to the raids of the previous year, the US losses were replaceable, while the Germans were already hard pressed due to the war in the East. Although not fatal, Big Week was an extremely worrying development for the Germans.^{[citation needed]} The lack of skilled pilots due to an attrition in the three-front war was the factor eroding the capability of the Jagdwaffe.^[34] According to McFarland & Newton (1991), the purported Allied strategy of sacrificing bombers in order to lure and kill Luftwaffe fighters was very effective. Freed of close bomber escort duty, Allied fighters, particularly the P-51s, inflicted severe losses on the Luftwaffe. German aircraft and pilot losses could not be sufficiently replaced. As a result, the Allies achieved air superiority by the time of the D-Day invasion.^[17]

The damage to the German aircraft industry was fairly limited.^[4][23][21] During 1944, German fighter aircraft production continued to increase, and actually peaked,^[4][21] by dispersing production and reducing the production of other aircraft types.^{[citation needed]}

• 20 February: The 3rd Bombardment Division failed to reach its target, the Tutow complex, due to long-hanging clouds. It attacked its secondary target Rostock instead.^[23] The 1st and 2nd Bombardment Divisions also failed to find their objectives, and bombed other places instead.^[23]
• 21 February: None of the 924 bombers who had departed hit their original targets, but diverted to other targets instead.^[23]
• 22 February: 252 B-24s were readied for combat, but due to various formation problems, only 177 took off, and only 74 saw combat action. During formation, several accidents occurred resulting in crashes and the deaths of dozens of crew members.^[24] Because of this, and the fact that low-hanging clouds were reported across central Germany, none of the 333 Boeing B-17 Flying Fortress bombers of the 3rd Bombardment Division reached their targets, as all of them were recalled early to prevent disaster.^[24] The remaining B-24s received the order to return to England much later, and efforts to turn the formation around caused chaos and fragmenting; on the way back to base, they looked for targets of opportunity, and eventually the Dutch cities of Nijmegen, Arnhem, Deventer and Enschede were selected and attacked.^[37] Approximately 880 civilians were killed in the disorderly Bombing of Nijmegen,^[6] while the actual target of opportunity, Nijmegen railway station (used for German arms transport), was barely damaged.^[38] In Enschede, 40 civilians were killed, 41 were injured, and hundreds of homes destroyed, causing 700 civilians to become homeless; the likely target of opportunity, in the middle of a residential area, was a small factory producing components for German missiles.^[39][7] In Arnhem, 57 civilians were killed and 86 homes destroyed, affecting 464 families in the residential areas of Rijnwijk and Malburgen; the target of opportunity was the Arnhem Rubber Factory (Arufa) on industrial terrain Het Broek, whose production capacity was largely in service of the German war effort.^[7][40]
• 23 February: All operations were suspended due to bad weather and for investigating operational failures during the previous day, especially the Bombing of Nijmegen.^[41]
• 24/25 February: RAF conducted an attack on the aircraft industry in Schweinfurt, doing little damage.^[31]
• 25/26 February 1944: RAF carried out an accurate attack on Augsburg, destroying some 60 percent of the industrial city.^[32]

Although the Allied goal of achieving air superiority was furthered, the Allied bombing of the German aircraft industry was ineffective.^[23] Moreover, the Allied losses were more severe than the German losses.^[4][5] On top of that, the high Dutch civilian death toll was a humanitarian catastrophe.^[42]

The bombing of Nijmegen on 22 February, which resulted from the aborted attack on the Gothaer Waggonfabrik, was a disaster in terms of barely damaging any targets of military importance while killing hundreds of civilians of the Netherlands (approximately 880 civilian deaths in Nijmegen^[6]), whose government-in-exile in London was part of the Allied coalition.^[41] On the day after the raid, 23 February, the Allied air force launched an investigation: all air raids planned for that day were canceled (also due to poor weather conditions), and all flyers and briefing officers involved were held on the base and questioned.^[41] In London, a diplomatic incident occurred between the American, British and Dutch military and civilian commanders and officials about what had happened, who should be granted access to which information, and in which order, and who should ultimately be held responsible, creating distrust within the Allied leadership for some time.^[41] The American military command was relatively late in drawing lessons from the disorderly air raid, which had struck an ally's civilian population hard.^[38] Not until mid-May 1944, orders were given to seek out targets of opportunity at least 30 kilometers away from the Netherlands' border.^[38] Nazi German propaganda attempted to exploit the tragedy in order to counter pro-Allied sympathies amongst the Dutch civilian population, but these efforts appear to have been ineffective, and perhaps even counterproductive.^[37]

Brinkhuis (1984) stated that several Allied actions during Operation Argument allowed the Allies to achieve air superiority, which would make subsequent bombing raids less risky and chaotic, and more effective.^[42] The tragic failures of the 22 February bombings of Dutch cities no one had ever heard of, which had resulted in almost a thousand civilian casualties and major infrastructural damage, were initially brushed off as an 'incident', and Operation Argument would be glorified as 'Big Week' in Allied historiography.^[42]

Otherwise, Big Week bolstered the confidence of US strategic bombing crews. Until that time, Allied bombers avoided contact with the Luftwaffe; now, the Americans used any method that would force the Luftwaffe into combat. Implementing this policy, the United States looked toward Berlin. Raiding the German capital, Allied leaders reasoned, would force the Luftwaffe to battle. On March 4, the USSTAF launched the first of several attacks against Berlin. A force of 730 bombers set off from England with an escort of 800 fighters. Fierce battles raged and resulted in heavy losses for both sides; 69 B-17s were lost but it cost the Luftwaffe 160 aircraft. The Allies, again, replaced their losses; the Luftwaffe, again, could not.^{[43][better source needed]}

The new German tactics of using Sturmböcke (heavily armed Fw 190s) as bomber destroyers and Bf 109Gs to escort them in Gefechtsverband formations, were proving somewhat effective.^{[citation needed]} The US fighters, kept in close contact with the bombers they were protecting, could not chase the attacking fighters before they were forced to turn around and return to the bombers.^{[citation needed]} General Doolittle responded by initiating a breakthrough in fighter tactics by "freeing" the fighters, allowing them to fly far ahead of the heavy bomber formations in an air supremacy "fighter sweep" mode on the outward legs; then following the USAAF heavies' bomb runs, the fighters roamed far from the bomber streams and hunted down German fighters – especially the Sturmböcke, that had limited maneuverability with their heavy underwing conformal gun pod-mount autocannons – before they could ever approach the USAAF bombers.^{[citation needed]} Though the change was unpopular with the bomber crews, its effects were immediate and extremely effective.^{[citation needed]}

The Combined Bomber Offensive attacks against fighter production officially ended on 1 April 1944, and control of the air forces passed to US General Dwight D. Eisenhower in preparation for the invasion of France. The combined heavy bomber forces were now used in the Transport Plan destroying railway supply lines to and within France to reduce German capacity to respond to invasion on the French coast. Allied airmen were well on the way to achieving air superiority over all of Europe. Russell (1999) stated: "While they continued strategic bombing, the USAAF turned its attention to the tactical air battle in support of the Normandy invasion".^{[43][better source needed]} According to Kenneth P. Werell (1986), the battle for air superiority was very costly for both sides, but by 1 April 1944, the Allies had gained the upper hand.^[21]

• Operation Steinbock, the German "baby blitz" against the UK, that was ongoing simultaneously with the "Big Week" campaign and afterwards.

• Hastings, Max (2013) [1979]. Bomber Command. MBI Publishing Co. ISBN 978-0-76034520-7.
• Holland, James (2018). Big Week: The Biggest Air Battle of World War Two. London: Bantam Press. ISBN 978-0-59307797-9.
• Scutts, J. (1994). Mustang Aces of the Eighth Air Force, Osprey Publishing, ISBN 1-85532-447-4
• Weal, John. (2006). Bf 109 Defense of the Reich Aces, Osprey Publishing, ISBN 1-84176-879-0
• Yenne, Bill. (2012). "Big Week: Six Days That Changed The Course of World War II"; Penguin; ISBN 978-0-425-25575-9