Langbahn Team – Weltmeisterschaft

Amman Message

The Amman Message (Arabic: رسالة عمان, romanizedRisālat ʿAmmān) is a statement calling for tolerance and unity in the Muslim world that was issued on 9 November 2004 (27 Ramadan 1425 AH) by King Abdullah II bin Al-Hussein of Jordan, and his advisor Sheikh Izz-Eddine Al-Tamimi. The message aims to "clarify to the modern world the true nature of Islam and the nature of true Islam," and to specify which actions do and do not represent the religion.[1]

A three-point ruling was issued by 200 Islamic scholars from over 50 countries, focusing on issues of defining who is a Muslim, excommunication from Islam (takfir), and principles related to delivering religious opinions (fatāwa).[2] The message received substantial support from the royal family of Jordan and the Royal Islamic Strategic Studies Centre, which was set up for the purpose of its promotion. Through its website, the Amman Message is accessible in English and Arabic.

Content

The Amman Message was delivered in Amman, Jordan, as a Ramadan sermon by Chief Justice Sheikh Izz-Eddine Al-Tamimi in the presence of King Abdullah II and a number of Muslim scholars.[3] In a subsequent speech, King Abdullah invited 24 senior scholars from all legal schools to debate the following questions:

  1. Who is a Muslim?
  2. Is it permissible to declare someone an apostate?
  3. Who has the right to undertake issues relating to fatwas (legal rulings)?[1]

The next year, in July 2005, an Islamic convention brought together 200 Muslim scholars from over 50 countries who issued a three-point declaration, later known as the "Three Points of the Amman Message".[2] This declaration focused on:[4]

  1. The recognition of eight legal schools of sharia or fiqh (madhāhib) and the varying schools of Islamic theology, namely:[5][6]
    1. Sunni Hanafi
    2. Sunni Maliki
    3. Sunni Shafi'i
    4. Sunni Hanbali
    5. Shia Jaʿfari
    6. Shia Zaydi
    7. Ẓāhirī
    8. Ibadi
    • And forbiddance of declaring anyone an apostate who is a follower of:[5]
    1. the Ashʿari or Maturidi creed
    2. real Tasawwuf (Sufism)
    3. true Salafi thought
  2. The forbiddance from pronouncing disbelief (takfir) upon or excommunicating others recognised as Muslims
  3. The stipulations placed as preconditions to the issuing of religious edicts, intended to prevent the circulation of illegitimate edicts

Background

The declaration was created in the midst of global tensions relating to the War on Terror following the September 11 attacks, and in the wake of the Iraq War. Where the message is primarily constructed as an internal dialogue between Muslim scholars, it clearly addresses Western powers. Explaining why the message was issued, King Abdullah stated: "[W]e felt that the Islamic message of tolerance was being subjected to a fierce and unjust attack from some in the West who do not understand Islam's essence, and others who claim to be associated with Islam and hide behind Islam to commit irresponsible deeds."[7]

Conference and declarations

The following are conferences and declarations related to the message:[1]

  • The International Islamic Conference: True Islam and Its Role in Modern Society, Amman, 27–29 Jumada II 1426 AH (4–6 July 2005 CE),
  • Forum of Muslim Ulama and Thinkers, Mecca, 5–7 Sha'ban 1426 AH (9–11 September 2005),
  • First International Islamic Conference Concerning the Islamic Schools of Jurisprudence and the Modern Challenges, Al al-Bayt University, 13–15 Shawwal AH (15–17 November 2005),
  • The Third Extraordinary Session of the Organization of the Islamic Conference, 5–6 Dhu al-Qadah 1426 AH (7–8 December 2005),
  • The Second International Conference of the Assembly for Moderate Islamic Thought and Culture, 25–27 Rabi' I 1427 AH (24–26 April 2006),
  • The International Islamic Fiqh Academy Conference Seventeenth Session, Amman, 28 Jumada I – 2 Jumada II 1427 AH (24–28 June 2006),
  • Muslims of Europe Conference, Istanbul, 1–2 July 2006,
  • The ninth session of the council of the Conference of Ministers of Religious Endowments and Islamic Affairs, Kuwait, 20–21 1426 AH (22–23 November 2005),
  • Amman Message in the Eyes of Others: Dialogue, Moderation, Humanity, Hashemite University, 20–21 September 2006

Fatwas and endorsements

The following is a list of some of the individuals and organisations who have issued fatwas and endorsements in relation to the Amman Message:[1]

Sr No Name Title Country Sect Fiqh Endorsing fatwa Website Image
1 Muhammad Sayyid Tantawy Grand Imam of Al-Azhar University Egypt Egypt Sunni Shafiʿi Fatwa Official website
2 Ali Gomaa Grand Mufti of Egypt Egypt Egypt Sunni Shafiʿi Fatwa [1]
3 Ali Bardakoğlu President of the Grand Council for Religious Affairs, Turkey Turkey Turkey Sunni Hanafi Fatwa Official website
4 Ahmed Kuftaro Grand Mufti of Syria Syria Syria Sunni Shafiʿi Fatwa Official website Archived 2014-10-21 at the Wayback Machine
5 Said Abd Al-Hafiz Al-Hijjawi Grand Mufti of Jordan Jordan Jordan Sunni Shafiʿi Fatwa
6 Nuh Ha Mim Keller Islamic scholar Jordan Jordan Sunni Shafiʿi Fatwa
7 Yusuf al-Qaradawi Director of the Sunna and Sira Council Egypt Egypt
Qatar Qatar
Sunni Fatwa Official website
8 Abdullah bin Bayyah Vice President of the International Union of Muslim Scholars Mauritania Mauritania Sunni Maliki Fatwa Official website
9 Muhammad Taqi Usmani Vice President of the Islamic Fiqh Academy Pakistan Pakistan Sunni Hanafi Fatwa
10 Sayyid Shaykh Nazim Al-Haqqani Leader of the Naqshbandi Haqqani Sufi Order Northern Cyprus Northern Cyprus Sunni Hanafi Official website
11 Abdullah al-Harari Founder of the Al-Ahbash Ethiopia Ethiopia Sunni Shafiʿi Fatwa Official website Archived 2012-03-17 at the Wayback Machine
12 Muhammad Tahir ul-Qadri Founding Leader of Minhaj-ul-Quran International, Chief Executive of Minhaj International University Pakistan Pakistan Sunni Hanafi Official website
13 Habib Ali al-Jifri Founding Leader of Tabah Foundation in Abu Dhabi, Member of Royal Aal al-Bayt Institute for Islamic Thought in Amman Yemen Yemen Sunni Shafiʿi Official website
14 Habib Umar bin Hafiz Founding Leader and the dean of Dar al-Mustafa in Tarim, Yemen Yemen Yemen Sunni Shafiʿi Official website
15 Ali Hosseini Khamenei Grand Ayatollah, Supreme Leader of Iran Iran Iran Shia Jafari Fatwa Official website
16 Muhammad Saeed al-Hakim Grand Ayatollah Iraq Iraq Shia Jafari Fatwa Official website
17 Mohammad Ishaq Al-Fayyad Grand Ayatollah Iraq Iraq Shia Jafari Fatwa Official website
18 Basheer Hussain Najafi Grand Ayatollah Iraq Iraq Shia Jafari Fatwa Official website
19 Hussein Esmaeel al-Sadr Grand Ayatollah Iraq Iraq Shia Jafari Fatwa Official website
20 Fazel Lankarani Grand Ayatollah Iran Iran Shia Jafari Fatwa Official website
21 Muhammad Ali Al-Taskhiri Grand Ayatollah, General Secretary of Forum for Proximity of the Islamic Schools of Jurisprudence Iran Iran Shia Jafari Fatwa Official website
22 Mohammad Hussein Fadlallah Grand Ayatollah Lebanon Lebanon Shia Jafari Fatwa Official website
23 Muhammad bin Muhammad Ismail Al-Mansur
and
Humud bin Abbas Al-Mu'ayyad
Shaykh Yemen Yemen Shia Zaidiyyah Fatwa Official website
24 Ibrahim bin Muhammad Al-Wazir General Secretary, Islamic Unification and Works Movement Yemen Yemen Shia Zaidiyyah Fatwa Official website
25 Ahmad bin Hamad Al-Khalili Mufti of the Sultanate of Oman Oman Oman Ibadi Fatwa Official website
26 Ali Hosseini Sistani Grand Ayatollah Iraq Iraq Shia Jafari Fatwa Official website
27 Karīm al-Hussaynī The Āgā Khān IV, Imam of the Shia Imami Nizari Ismailis Portugal Portugal Shia Jafari (Nizari Ismaili branch) Fatwa Official website

Reception

According to a 2005 report issued by the International Crisis Group concerning the rise of Jihadi Islamism in the Middle East, the sermon "stressed the need to re-emphasise Islam's core values of compassion, mutual respect, tolerance, acceptance and freedom of religion."[8] Generally the Amman Message has been welcomed by Western leaders as a significant effort towards inter-religious dialogue in an epoch of particular global politico-religious complexity. It has been hailed as "one of the most important initiatives addressing the Christian West within the framework of civilisations"[1] during a period many worried would lead to a clash of civilisations, and has come to be seen as an international reference document.[9][10]

Tony Blair, while Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, praised the Amman Message and the gathering of numerous Islamic scholars, commenting: "this was a clear message that Islam is not a monolithic faith, but one made up of a rich pattern of diversity, albeit all flowing from the same fount."[2]

To address the Western world has been identified as an important aim of the Amman message, and herewith to serve the more strategic political goals of the Jordanian government and its regional partners. Several scholars have interpreted the declaration as an assertion from the Jordanian government to reassure its international allies of its own moderate stance and to create a position of religious authority within a crowded international arena.[11][12][13]

Whereas the declaration is promoted as a "unanimous agreement by all Muslims everywhere,"[14] observers have questioned the communicative process leading up to the agreement and its clarity of definitions, and have expressed concern over its tendency to create potential additional binary oppositions.[10][15] One scholar has pointed out that in spite of advancing "a more inclusive notion of an Islamic community, one also clarifies exclusion by erecting a boundary outside of which other groups will fall," adding that consensus was reached through "tactical silences over and evasions of contentious issues."[10] A lack of explicit reference to – or signatories from – specific communities is mentioned, such as the Alawi, and an omission of certain branches of other communities, such as the Isma'ili.[10] It has been observed that most scholars involved in the debate were those close to the Jordanian state.[citation needed]

The International Crisis Group report expressed the importance of the Amman Message within a context of increasing regional sectarian polarisation in the Middle East. However, it also mentions the likely limited impact of the message, which it assigns to its contents targeting mainly elites while lacking popular legitimacy.[8]

Further criticism has been expressed over the (lack of) actions or policies following the Amman declaration. Local Jordanian leaders have pointed to the limited impact of the Amman Message inside Jordan, manifested through the lack of engagement with the message by Jordanian municipalities, mosques and religious organisations.[11]

Suhail Nakhouda, editor-in-chief of the Amman-based magazine Islamica, stated that the Amman Message did little to effectively address ongoing problems within the country of Jordan: "The problem with the Amman Message is that it bears no relation to the situation on the ground. There is no water, no pavements; the economy is bad, and many young people are out of work. Peoples' lives, as well as the images they see, stay the same."[8] While some point to the religious legitimacy of the Hashemite royal family for its descent from the Islamic Prophet Muhammad,[16] Nakhouda states that King Abdullah's message is likely to be dampened by his lifestyle, which he claims is the subject of criticism.[8]

Despite the ecumenical nature of the Amman Message, a marked decline in Shia-Sunni relations as a result of increased sectarian conflict in such countries as Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Bahrain and Yemen has taken shape since the message was issued including armed conflict.[17] For some scholars, this has made declarations as the Amman Message all the more important.[18] Others have problematised what has been referred to as a declaration proliferation taking place post-9/11.[19]

See also

References

  1. ^ a b c d "Amman Message – The Official Site". Retrieved 15 May 2023.
  2. ^ a b c "Speech by the Prime Minister the Rt Hon Tony Blair MP Archived 2007-09-27 at the Wayback Machine" (04/06/07), British Embassy in Bahrain
  3. ^ "Jordan issues the 'Amman Message' on Islam". Embassy of Jordan - Washington, DC. Archived from the original on 16 August 2007. Retrieved 15 August 2007.
  4. ^ The Amman Message summary - Official website
  5. ^ a b The Three Points of The Amman Message V.1 Archived February 2, 2013, at the Wayback Machine
  6. ^ Petra News Agency. Summary of the Amman Message (In Arabic) Archived 2016-04-09 at the Wayback Machine
  7. ^ "King Abdullah calls to end extremism". The Jerusalem Post. Retrieved 15 August 2007.
  8. ^ a b c d "Jordan's 9/11: Dealing With Jihadi Islamism", Crisis Group Middle East Report N°47, 23 November 2005
  9. ^ Bonney, Richard (2008). False Prophets: the 'clash of civilisations' and the global war on terror. Oxford: Peter Lang. ISBN 9781906165024.
  10. ^ a b c d Browers, Michaelle (2011). "Official Islam and the Limits of Communicative Action: the paradox of the Amman Message". Third World Quarterly. 32 (5): 943–958. doi:10.1080/01436597.2011.578969. ISSN 0143-6597. JSTOR 41300408. S2CID 143679211.
  11. ^ a b Affairs, Berkley Center for Religion, Peace and World. ""Made" in Jordan: Assessing the Legacy of the Amman Message". berkleycenter.georgetown.edu. Retrieved 15 May 2023.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)
  12. ^ Gutkowski, Stacey (June 2016). "We are the very model of a moderate Muslim state: The Amman Messages and Jordan's foreign policy". International Relations. 30 (2): 206–226. doi:10.1177/0047117815598352. ISSN 0047-1178. S2CID 143376544.
  13. ^ Ikehata, Fukiko (1 January 2017). "Aspiring to be a Leader of Moderation: A Study on Jordan's Islamic Policy IKEHATA Fukiko". Kyoto Bulletin of Islamic Area Studies, 10.
  14. ^ "HM King Abdullah II – Amman Message". Retrieved 15 May 2023.
  15. ^ Sheline, Annelle R. (24 April 2020). "Shifting Reputations for "Moderation": Evidence from Qatar, Jordan, and Morocco". Middle East Law and Governance. 12 (1): 109–129. doi:10.1163/18763375-01201002. ISSN 1876-3367. S2CID 219001477.
  16. ^ Shalabi, Jamal Al (1 January 2011). "The Amman Message: Arab Diplomacy in the Dialogue of Civilizations". Journal of US-China Public Administration.
  17. ^ Volpi, Frederic (2012). Political Civility in the Middle East (1st ed.). New York: Routledge. ISBN 9781138209367.
  18. ^ Kearney, Jonathan (2018), Demiri, Lejla; Said, Yazid (eds.), "From Intra-Religious to Interreligious Dialogue: The Amman Message as a Precursor and Companion to the A Common Word Initiative", The Future of Interfaith Dialogue: Muslim-Christian Encounters through A Common Word, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 31–47, ISBN 978-1-107-13434-8, retrieved 15 May 2023
  19. ^ Affairs, Berkley Center for Religion, Peace and World. "Declaration Proliferation: The International Politics of Religious Tolerance". berkleycenter.georgetown.edu. Retrieved 15 May 2023.{{cite web}}: CS1 maint: multiple names: authors list (link)