Champa–Đại Việt War of 1471
Map of Đại Việt (dark pink) and Champa (light blue) before the war
Date February – March 22, 1471 Location Champa, Đại Việt Result Vietnamese victory Territorial changes Northern Champa (From Hải Vân Pass- Danang to north of Phú Yên) was annexed to Đại Việt Champa was reduced to Panduranga Champa became the vassal state of Đại Việt until being annexed in 1832 by emperor Minh Mạng Destruction of Hindu-Buddhist societal establishments in Champa Irreversible Islamization of Champa
Belligerents
Champa	Đại Việt
Commanders and leaders
Maha Sajan (POW)[1]	Lê Thánh Tông Đinh Liệt
Strength
100,000 (including elephant corps)	250,000 150,000 land forces 100,000 naval forces
Casualties and losses
60,000 death 30,000 POW >40,400 beheaded[2]	Unknown

The Cham–Đại Việt War of 1471 or Vietnamese invasion of Champa was a military expedition launched by Lê Thánh Tông of Đại Việt under the Lê dynasty and is widely regarded as the event that marked the downfall of Champa. In retaliation for Cham raids, Vietnamese forces attacked and sacked the kingdom's largest city-state, Vijaya, and defeated the Cham army, bringing the kingdom of Champa to an end.^[3] After this war, the border between of Đại Việt and Champa was moved from Hải Vân Pass to Cù Mông Pass from 1471 till 1611 when Nguyễn lords launched another invasions into South of Phú Yên and annexed it in 1611.

The Cham and the Vietnamese had a long history of conflict. In the course of their wars, peace often coincided with economic exhaustion, with the antagonists rebuilding their economies just to go to war again.^[4]

When fighting resumed in 1471, the Champa kingdom found itself weakened and isolated. It had experienced numerous civil wars and, at one point, had five different rulers.^[5] Because of the Cham's earlier attack on Angkor, the Khmers ignored their request for assistance when Đại Việt invaded.^[6] After an expedition to Champa of 1446, Vietnamese efforts to hold the Cham king as a vassal quickly failed and relations between the two kingdoms deteriorated.^[7]

From mid-15th century onward, Champa's power must have been factually waned. No Vijaya Champa inscription or document survives after the last, which was erected in 1456, but this may have been due to the destruction of the mandalas in 1471 by the Vietnamese. The incompletely-studied decline of Champa, as historian Michael Vickery has asserted, must be pieced together from Vietnamese and Chinese histories and competently restudied.

According to the Ming Shilu, the Dai Viet launched a preliminary incursion into Champa in 1461, which forced the king's younger brother Mo-he-pan-luo-yue (摩訶槃羅悅) to flee to the mountains. The ruling king was Pan-luo-cha-quan (槃羅茶全), Panlotchatsuen (in Jesuit Notice Historique Sur la Cochinchine) or Trà Toàn, who allegedly reigned from 1460 to 1471 until he was captured by the Dai Viet.^[8]

The Cham also requested that Ming China intervene and help bring the Vietnamese back in line by force and demarcate the border between Champa and Vietnam. China, however, only verbally rebuked the Vietnamese for their incursion, as the Ming Chinese sought to preserve trade and border security rather than continue expansion. The Vietnamese ignored the rebuke and proceeded with their plan to destroy their rival.^[9]

The new Emperor of Dai Viet, Lê Thánh Tông, was a Confucian student. One of his key goals in diplomacy was fostering a Sinocentric worldview among Southeast Asian states; he wanted to get rid of formal connection with other Southeast Asian kingdoms in a revolutionary effort to transform his kingdom from an 'eclectic Southeast Asian aristocratic model' to the bureaucratic one based on Ming China's institutions.^[10] His focus on relations with Champa was "to bring civilization (Sinitic-leaning) to whom he considers uncivilized".^[11][10][12]

To achieve his plan of overthrowing Champa, Thánh Tông spent years preparing the military, stockpiling provisions, and escalating incidents and animosity toward the Cham.^[13] These efforts included mobilization of huge manpower forces and in particular, the gunpowder unit, significantly drawn from the Ming model.^[14] Special emphasis was placed on weapons, transportation, and communications.^[15] Finally, Thánh Tông amplified and exaggerated Cham raids in his reports to the Ming, choosing them as pretexts for war against Champa.^[12]

According to Vietnamese sources, in 1470 a Cham army numbering 100,000 under King Maha Sajan arrived and besieged the Vietnamese garrison at Huế. The local commander sent appeals to Hanoi for help.^[16] Thánh Tông responded angrily to the attack. Within weeks, soldiers were mobilized, provisions were collected and transported south, and delegations hastened to inform the Ming court of what was planned. Three months later, during the winter season, Thánh Tông published the detailed campaign orders to his generals and proclaiming in a long edict the reasons for the expedition.^[7] The edict routinely depicted the Cham as subhuman beasts.^[2] The emperor noted that "like animals, they eat their fill and forget their moral debt", and he declared that "in the south, we see a pig wallowing in the mud." In short, Thánh Tông's edict is considerably important to historians, because might be regarded as a "classic, and literal, example of the dehumanising process necessary for and often a prelude to acts of genocide."^[2]

On November 28, 1470, a 100,000-strong Vietnamese naval expedition led by Thánh Tông himself set out from Hóa Châu to attack Champa, followed by another 150,000 civilian support personnel on December 8. The Phủ biên tạp lục states that the king reached Thuận Hóa citadel in early 1471, while the Toàn thư says he sailed straight to Champa.^[17] Fighting started on February 24, 1471, when five hundred Vietnamese warships and 30,000 troops were ordered forth to block the way of 5,000 reinforced Cham troops and elephants at Bay of Sa Kỳ (20 miles south of Quảng Ngãi). Then one thousand warships and 70,000 troops followed under the leadership of Thánh Tông, trying to flank Cham positions from the north. The fleet began embarking troops on land near Hội An (Great Chiêm Estuary) and went engaging Cham defenders.

Meanwhile, another Vietnamese column quietly moved west of the mountains. After bitter fighting, the Cham withdrew their lines from the coast to inland, where they realized that they had been surrounded by invaders from three sides: from the north, from the western mountains, and from the sea. On February 26, using heavy artillery, the king besieged and captured the Mễ Cần citadel in Quảng Ngãi, killing 300 Chams. The Vietnamese continued to advance, using gunpowder superiority to curb war elephants, pushing the Cham army toward the capital of Vijaya (Cha Ban).^[18]

After two weeks of fierce fightings, one-third of Champa territory corresponding to today Đà Nẵng, Quảng Nam, and Quảng Ngãi had been taken by the Vietnamese. Thánh Tông's army then marched south toward Bình Định, main center of the Champa Kingdom. Nearby Thị Nại citadel on the coast was captured on March 18, and 400 Cham were killed.^[16] Thánh Tông then converged his armies to surround the city of Vijaya (12 miles west of Thị Nại) on March 19, where the Champa king was seeking refugee inside.^[16] According to Vietnamese sources, the Cham king Trà Toàn apparently tried to compromise and make an agreement for his kingdom's surrender, but Thánh Tông ignored and pressed on the siege.^[18][19]

The attackers surrounded Vijaya by multiple circumventing lines of fences and trenches, cutting off the besieged defenders from relief while launching non-stop terrifying bombardments and scaling ladders attacks against the city's wall defenders. This came at a massive financial cost, since it drained the Vietnamese treasury of 1,000 gold liang a day.^[20] The Vietnamese forces used cannons to bombard the Cham capital, Vijaya, blasting a breach in the east of the city's walls prior to storming the city.^[21][3] On March 22, the city fell after a four-day siege. More than 30,000 Chams were captured, including Trà Toàn and his family members, who were deported to the north, and over 60,000 killed.^[22][16] Another 40,000 were executed.^[19]

The Malay Annals accounts for the fall of Champa mention that the king of Kuchi (Đại Việt) sent messengers to the Treasure Minister of Champa, deceiving him to defect and open the city gate. At dawn the men of Đại Việt entered the city and vanquished the Cham defenders with ease, Vak (Vijaya) fell and the king of Champa was slain.^[16]

The balance of power maintained between the Cham and the Vietnamese for more than 500 years came to an end with the destruction of the Champa kingdom. The Vietnamese enslaved several thousand Chams and forced Chams to assimilate into Vietnamese culture. The number included 50 members of the royal family.^[5] In 1509, Thánh Tông's grandson, Lê Uy Mục, carried out a massacre against remaining Cham royal members and slaves in the neighborhood of capital Hanoi. In autumn that year, the king also issued executions for all remaining Cham prisoners that had been captured in the 1471 war.^[23]

A Cham general, Bố Trì Trì, fled and established himself as the ruler of the rump state of Panduranga (modern Phan Rang), more than 250 kilometers to the south. That state lasted until 1832, when emperor Minh Mạng initiated the final conquest of the remnants of Champa. Trì Trì and two others, a ruler in the Central Highlands (the region of Kon Tum and Pleiku) and a ruler on the coast immediately to the south of Bình Định (in the modern provinces of Phú Yên and Khánh Hòa), subsequently submitted to Thánh Tông as vassals.^[24] In the conquered land, king Thánh Tông established Quảng Nam as Đại Việt's 13th province, with 42 military colonies (Đồn điền), setting up administration, customary, regulations,... according to Vietnamese Confucian establishment. Đỗ Tử Quy was appointed as governor of Quảng Nam.^[25]

Cham representatives told the Ming Empire that Annam destroyed their country. The Chinese Ming Dynasty records evidence the extent of the Vietnamese destruction wrought on Champa. The Chams informed the Ming that they continued to fight against the Vietnamese occupation of their land, which had been turned into the 13th province of Đại Việt.^[26] In 1474, Bố Trì Trì rebelled against the Vietnamese by mounting guerilla warfare in the western mountainous jungles with Trà Toàn's son Trà Toại. Thánh Tông sent Lê Niệm and 30,000 soldiers to Panduranga, where they put down the Cham revolt, captured Trà Toại and imprisoned him in dungeon at Hanoi. Cham resistance continued in the mountains and valleys in the south.^[26] The Ming annals recorded that in 1485 that "Champa is a distant and dangerous place, and Annam is still employing troops there."^[25]

The Vietnamese ceramics trade was severely affected due to the impact suffered by the Cham merchants after the invasion.^[27] The Ming scholar Wu Pu (吳樸) recommended that to help stop the Vietnamese, Ming should help resuscitate the Champa Kingdom.^[28] The Ming dynasty however did not follow his recommendation, due to internal security concerns.^{[citation needed]}

A massive wave of Cham emigration radiated across Southeast Asia. In Cambodia, Cham refugees were welcomed, but the sources do not describe how they arrived in Cambodia and where they settled. In Thailand, there are records of Cham presence since the Ayudhaya period. In the Indonesian archipelago, the Sejarah Melayu (Malay Annals) relates that after the collapse of Vijaya in 1471, two Cham princes named Indera Berma Shah and Shah Palembang sought asylum in Melaka and Aceh. Shortly after his conversion to Islam, Indera Berma Shah was appointed minister at the court of Sultan Mansur Shah. The Sejarah Melayu also mentions Cham presence in Pahang and Kelantan, where the Kampung Laut Mosque is said to have been built by Champa sailors on their way to Java.

The Ming Empire sent a censor, Ch'en Chun, to Champa in 1474 to install the Champa King, but his entry was blocked by Vietnamese soldiers who had taken over Champa. He proceeded to Malacca instead and its ruler sent back tribute to the Ming dynasty.^[29] Malacca sent envoys again in 1481 to inform the Ming that, while going back to Malacca in 1469 from a trip to China, the Vietnamese attacked them, castrating the young and enslaving them. The Malaccans reported that Đại Việt was in control of Champa and sought to conquer Malacca, but the Malaccans did not fight back, due to a lack of permission from the Ming to engage in war. The Ming Emperor scolded them, ordering the Malaccans to strike back with violent force if the Vietnamese attacked.^[30][31]

However, as Đại Việt's power declined during the sixteenth century, the rise of the Burmese Empire under Tabinshweti and Bayinnaung to become the major force in mainland Southeast Asia had put an end to Vietnamese expansion.^[32]

More ethnic Vietnamese had moved south and settled on conquered Cham lands.^[33] Only the small Cham kingdom of Panduranga remained in the south. Having suffered a large number of population loss in a short period of time–though accurate figure might have represented is impossible to determine for lack of any remotely usable statistics–the Cham would never regain a significant power position until being fully annexed in the 19th century.^[2] Around 162,000 Cham remain in Vietnam today.^[6]

Several historians view the 1471 Vietnamese attack on Champa and extraordinary violence against Cham civilians satisfy the modern definition of genocide as the mass-killings were systemically delivered with the aim of destroying a particular nation or group; in this case, the Cham people, who experienced an "inexorable demographic decline" as the most notably consequence of the conquest.^[2] Not only that, the sudden Cham population collapse recorded in the occupied regions was hastened by state-organized movements of settlers moving into and permanently eliminating the existing Cham society and replacing it with the society of the Vietnamese colonizers.^[2]

It is generally believed that the Vietnamese conquest of Champa in 1471 had directly contributed to the eventual conversion to Islam by the majority of Cham population. Even before the Vietnamese conquest, Islam had already started to make ground in Champa by the 10th century, but only by this war that Islam finally hastily established the foothold among the Cham population; it was believed that in order to resist the increasingly aggressive Confucian-Buddhist Vietnamese expansion, conversion to Islam made it an important component of the Cham identity and to seek protection from the Islamic World (dar al-Islam) against Vietnamese aggression.^[34]

• Schottenhammer, Angela; Ptak, Roderich (2006). The Perception of Maritime Space in Traditional Chinese Sources. Otto Harrassowitz Verlag. ISBN 978-3-447-05340-2.
• Chapuis, Oscar (1995). A history of Vietnam: from Hong Bang to Tu Duc. Greenwood Publishing Group. ISBN 0-313-29622-7.
• Coedès, George (2015), The Making of South East Asia (RLE Modern East and South East Asia), Taylor & Francis
• Hall, Kenneth (1999), "Economic History of Early Southeast Asia", in Tarling, Nicholas (ed.), The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia: Volume 1, From Early Times to c. 1800, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
• Kiernan, Ben (2009). Blood and Soil: A World History of Genocide and Extermination from Sparta to Darfur. Yale University Press. ISBN 978-0-300-14425-3.
• Kiernan, Ben (2019). Việt Nam: a history from earliest time to the present. Oxford University Press. ISBN 978-0-1900-5379-6.
• Kohn, George (1999), Dictionary of Wars, London: Routledge, ISBN 978-1-135-95494-9
• Maspero, Georges (2002). The Champa Kingdom. White Lotus Co., Ltd. ISBN 978-9-747-53499-3.
• Moseley, Alexander (2007). A Philosophy of War. Algora Publishing. ISBN 978-0-87586-183-8.
• Nakamura, Rie (1999). Cham in Vietnam: Dynamics of Ethnicity. Department of Anthropology, University of Washington, Seattle: Unpublished PhD dissertation.
• Nakamura, Rie (2000). "The Coming of Islam to Champa". Journal of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society. 73 (1): 55–66. JSTOR 41493412.
• Nakamura, Rie (2008). "The Cham Muslims in Ninh Thuan Province, Vietnam" (PDF). CIAS Discussion Paper No. 3: Islam at the Margins: The Muslims of Indochina. 3: 7–23.
• Nakamura, Rie (2020). A Journey of Ethnicity: In Search of the Cham of Vietnam. Cambridge Scholars Publisher. ISBN 978-1-52755-034-6.
• Purton, Peter (2010), A History of the Late Medieval Siege 1200–1500, The Boydell Press
• Ray, Nick (2007). Lonely Planet Vietnam. Lonely Planet.
• Rost, Reinhold (1887). Miscellaneous papers relating to Indo-China: reprinted for the Straits Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society from Dalrymple's "Oriental Repertory," and the "Asiatic Researches" and "Journal" of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, Volume 1. London: Trübner & Co.
• Sun, Laichen (2006), "Chinese Gunpowder Technology and Đại Việt, ca. 1390–1497", in Reid, Anthony; Tran, Nhung Tuyet (eds.), Viet Nam: Borderless Histories, Cambridge: University of Wisconsin Press, pp. 72–120, ISBN 978-1-316-44504-4
• Taylor, K.W. (2013). A History of the Vietnamese. Cambridge University Press. ISBN 978-0-521-87586-8.
• Tsai, Shih-shan Henry (1996). The eunuchs in the Ming dynasty. SUNY Press. ISBN 0-7914-2687-4.
• Wang, Gungwu (1998), "Ming foreign relations: Southeast Asia", in Twitchett, Denis Crispin; Fairbank, John K. (eds.), The Cambridge History of China: Volume 8, The Ming Dynasty, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 301–332
• Whitmore, John K. (2004). "The Two Great Campaigns of the Hong-Duc Era (1470–97) in Dai Viet". South East Asia Research. 12: 119–136. doi:10.5367/000000004773487965. S2CID 147668687 – via JSTOR.
• Yamazaki, Takeshi (April 22, 2014). "Tongking Gulf under Reconquest? Maritime Interaction Between China and Vietnam Before and After the Diplomatic Crisis in the Sixteenth Century". Crossroads – Studies on the History of Exchange Relations in the East Asian World. 8: 193–216. Archived from the original on August 24, 2017. Retrieved May 2, 2016 – via www.eacrh.net.
• Zottoli, Brian A. (2011), Reconceptualizing Southern Vietnamese History from the 15th to 18th Centuries: Competition along the Coasts from Guangdong to Cambodia, University of Michigan
•  This article incorporates text from Miscellaneous papers relating to Indo-China: reprinted for the Straits Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society from Dalrymple's "Oriental Repertory," and the "Asiatic Researches" and "Journal" of the Asiatic Society of Bengal, Volume 1, by Royal Asiatic Society of Great Britain and Ireland. Straits Branch, Reinhold Rost, a publication from 1887, now in the public domain in the United States.