Wikipedia:WikiProject Military history/News/June 2017/Op-ed
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Command in the Battle of Messines |
- By Hawkeye7
Between the battles around Arras and Bullecourt in April and May 1917 and Third Ypres in the second half of the year came the Battle of Messines in June. By mid-1917, the British Expeditionary Force (BEF) on the Western Front had largely overcome its logistical difficulties, and artillery ammunition was available in enormous quantities. This facilitated the development of tactics based around overwhelming firepower. While there seemed little prospect of inflicting a decisive defeat on the German Army, with these tactics the BEF might be able to force another retreat as in the German retreat to the Hindenburg Line earlier in the year. There was only one part of the Western Front that this might make much of a difference: the northernmost part of the line, in Belgium, where it could force the evacuation of the Belgian coast.
The first stage of this campaign, which would occupy the BEF for most of the rest of the year, was the seizure of the high ground around Messines (called Mesen in Flemish, the local language) and Wytschaete (Wijtschate). This was the southernmost part of a ridge line. The Germans considered the benefit of holding the high ground to outweigh the difficulties of having the enemy on three sides. The sector around Messines and Armentieres, just across the French border 9 kilometres (5.6 mi) to the south, was a relatively quiet one, and often used by both sides as a "nursery sector", where divisions new to the Western Front could become accustomed to the conditions before being sent to a more active sector. For this reason, the 3rd Australian Division was sent to the sector in November 1916.
The 3rd Division had been raised in February 1916, and was the last Australian division to reach the Western Front. Rather than attempt to train it in Australia, it had been sent to England, where it had trained on Salisbury Plain. Being raised in Australia, it had fewer veterans than the 4th and 5th Divisions, which had been formed in Egypt, so it was given more training. In composition it was similar to the other divisions of the Australian Imperial Force (AIF), with an infantry brigade from New South Wales (9th), one from Victoria (10th), and one from the "outer" states (11th), with the anomaly that the 10th Infantry Brigade's 40th Infantry Battalion was raised in Tasmania. In addition to their distinctive oval-shaped shoulder patches, they wore the brims of their slouch hats turned down. Like most divisions in the BEF, it was about 20,000 strong. It was commanded by Major General John Monash, who had led the 13th Infantry Brigade in Australia before the war, and then the 4th Infantry Brigade in the Gallipoli campaign and on the Western Front. He was a civil engineer in private life. He could also speak German fluently, and was instrumental in bringing German ideas into Australian military thought.
Due to the low-lying nature of the ground, holes tended to fill with water. Parts of the front line were therefore not trenches, but above-ground breastworks made of sandbags. Although on higher ground, the Germans had a similar problem. Instead of the deep dugouts characteristic of other sectors, there were reinforced concrete structures the English-speaking soldiers called "pillboxes". Some had firing slits, but most were simple boxes, with a door at the back. They were usually camouflaged, but artillery barrages exposed them. The new platoon organisation proved excellent for attacking pillboxes. In keeping with the new German doctrine adopted by the BEF, the front line was thinly held. Until the battle began, the entire 3rd Division front was held by a single battalion, the 41st Infantry Battalion. Lacking the manpower to perform the necessary maintenance, the wooden frames between the manned outposts rotted, and the breastworks collapsed. It was possible for patrols to enter the opposing trenches without encountering anyone.
The 3rd Division formed part of II Anzac Corps, which also included the New Zealand Division and a British division, the 25th. For the battle, the 4th Division was assigned from I Anzac Corps. This was commanded by Major General William Holmes. The son of an Army officer, Holmes had literally been born in Victoria Barracks in Sydney, where he lived as a boy, and had joined the Army as a bugler when he was ten. As a civilian, he was a clerk in the Metropolitan Board of Water Supply and Sewerage. As a part-time soldier like Monash, he commanded the 6th Infantry Brigade in Australia before the war. After the war broke out, he commanded the Australian Naval and Military Expeditionary Force in New Guinea. He returned to Australia in 1915, and joined the AIF, assuming command of the 5th Infantry Brigade, which he led at Gallipoli, and in the Battle of Pozieres. He became commander of the 4th Division in December 1916. The division had taken heavy casualties in the First Battle of Bullecourt in April.
II Anzac Corps was commanded by Lieutenant General Sir Alexander Godley, widely regarded as one of the rustier rifles on the rack. In turn II Anzac Corps formed part of General Sir Herbert Plumer's British Second Army. Plumer had a reputation as the best of the BEF's five army commanders. He considered Messines his greatest battle, and after the war would take up the victory title of Baron Plumer of Messines and of Bilton. His chief of staff was a highly capable officer, Major General Charles Harington. Armies didn't move around as much as corps or divisions, and this gave Plumer and his staff plenty of time to consider an attack at Messines, which the German high command regarded as impractical. Planning began in early 1916. Plumer envisioned a systematic advance on Wytschaete from both sides of the salient over three days. II Anzac Corps would form the southern prong, with the British IX Corps in the centre and the British X Corps in the north. The plan was disapproved by the BEF's commander, Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, who wanted the whole area captured in just one day.
This was possible, but only because of the availability of artillery. The Second Army attack would be supported by 2,400 guns, of which 800 were medium or heavy. This worked out to about one gun for every 7 yards (6.4 m) of front. About half the 18-pounders would lay down a creeping barrage 700 yards (640 m) deep. This would move forward in short lifts. The infantry had to follow the barrage closely and overcome any resistance before it got away from them. Plumer laid down two objectives: the Black line, which was the crest of the ridge; and the Green Line, which was at the far foot of the ridge and which was the German fallback position known by the British as the Oostaverne Line. Originally, the 3rd Division was only responsible for capturing the Black Line, while the 4th Division would deal with the Green Line; but on Godley added a 300 yards (270 m) stretch of the Green Line to the 3rd Division's objectives.
Efforts were made to conceal the approach from enemy aircraft and the 3rd Division painted their bayonets black to prevent them gleaming in the moonlight. Experience in the Battle of Vimy Ridge had shown that such a severe bombardment would leave the ground so pock marked with craters that the enemy fire and communications trenches would be obliterated with the result that enemy dugouts might appear in unexpected places. The solution was to have mopping up parties systematically search all the shell holes as each could potentially contain snipers or machine guns. Mopping up parties had been utilised on the Somme in 1916 by British units, but now their use was doctrine throughout the BEF, and far more formalised. German counterattacks were expected. The immediate counterattacks (launched at the initiative of local commanders) had to be dealt with by the assaulting troops and the reserves behind them. The idea was to overwhelm the immediately available reserves. The more dangerous counterattacks organised in depth were dealt with by not allowing the advance to continue beyond the range of the artillery. Such counterattacks would then run straight into the standing and protective barrages.
Monash paid the Canadian Corps a visit to find out about why Vimy Ridge had been so successful. He noted a great many things, including the use of No. 106 Fuzes for wire cutting, the counterbattery fire arrangements, the value of the new platoon organisation, the machine gun barrage, ammunition supply arrangements, and more. He surveyed the Messines battlefield from an observation post on Hill 63. He noted that his attack would be dependent on the New Zealanders' capture of Messines, because the German trenches around Messines enfiladed his attack. It was clear that this would be a difficult assignment for an inexperienced division. He also noted that his approach routes were fairly obvious, and likely to be shelled with gas and high explosive shells. Working with his Assistant Adjutant and Quartermaster General (AA&QMG) (the staff officer responsible for administration), Lieutenant Colonel H. M. Farmar, he went over the administrative arrangements for traffic control, and the siting of supply dumps and aid posts. Farmar was a British Army officer, as was Monash's GSO1 (the staff officer responsible for operations), Lieutenant Colonel G. H. N. Jackson.
Monash had his brigade commanders, Brigadier Generals Alexander Jobson (9th) and Walter McNicoll (10th) submit their plans. He approved them in outline, but went over them in detail. Both commanders had generally gone down only to allotting tasks to companies; Monash went all the way down to the platoon level, detailing how much frontage each would have. He focused on the assault crossing of the Douve, a small stream. The maps said it was 12 feet (3.7 m) deep in winter, and dry in summer. He assumed it would be unfordable, so the 40th Battalion was given the task of laying six small wooden bridges over the stream. The German defences covering the Douve would be assaulted from different directions by units with specific sections as their objectives. Every commander in the division was required to be familiar with the objectives of the units on his flanks, as he would have to assist in their capture once his own objectives were taken.
To ensure that this was indeed that case, Monash held a series of conferences, which the heads of all branches were required to attend. No detail was too small to be discussed, and circulars were issued covering matters as diverse as "Anti-Aircraft", "Water Supply", and "Burial of the Dead". The medical staff were required to attend, and some junior commanders were surprised to have Monash ask for their opinions on the plan, which was codenamed "Magnum Opus" Enough aerial photographs were produced to allow every battalion commander to have his own set of images of the battlefield and they were expected to show them to at least their company commanders. The 3rd Pioneer Battalion constructed a contour model on the scale of 1:100 horizontal and 1:26 vertical, showing the ground to be captured and features such as the enemy trench systems, ditches, hedges, ruins, roads, trench tramways and wire obstacles, and all personnel were encouraged to study it
In short, Monash was a micromanager; but once the battle began, there was little that generals could do. Monash relied on his platoon and company commanders understanding what his intentions were, and what was required of them, and acting accordingly. In the event, few battles went so far according to plan as this one. The bombardment, barrages and explosion of the mines dazed the enemy and resistance was weak. The artillery easily dealt with the only counterattack. A number of casualties at this stage resulted from the line being held too heavily, because casualties in the initial stages were lower than expected, and in the construction of defences that were not required. The afternoon advance to the final objective was tougher. For the first time "leap frogging" was done with divisions, the 4th Division passing through the New Zealand Division. This arrangement would complicate the defence plan no end over the next few days, but worked fine on the first day.
One area where Monash's command was criticised was in the manner in which he exercised it from his headquarters, rarely visiting the front line. Whereas Holmes toured the front line, visiting all his battalions the day after the attack to ensure that everyone was in the correct location. Charles Bean noted that Monash:
... pressed for precise information, but it was difficult to obtain; although the 3rd Division perhaps surpassed other Australian divisions in the careful carrying out of orders by subordinates, it lacked as yet their general high standard of personal supervision in battle by commanding officers. Well trained though its leaders were, some of them (as those whose practice was different often complained) were content to acquiesce in the theory, with which General Monash possibly agreed, that the commander's duty in time of battle was to remain strictly at his headquarters. Thus, in too high a proportion of units, reconnaissance at critical times, or even during the pauses in an action, tended to be left to intelligence or other staff officers, who did not carry with them the powers of decision and of spurring to effort, which officers in command would have possessed.
On 2 July 1917, almost a month after the battle, Holmes took the Premier of New South Wales, William Holman, to survey the Messines battlefield. A German shell landed nearby and Holmes was killed. Today, Holmes is remembered by General Holmes Drive, the road that runs past Sydney Airport.
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